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ABSTRACT 
A growing number of states have created multiple fusion centers, including 
California. In addition to having a state fusion center, California has four regional 
centers statewide. Each center is separately governed, but intended to work 
together as a unified, statewide system. Given their recognized autonomy, the 
relationship between California’s fusion centers is voluntary and “horizontal” 
versus “hierarchical,” with no single entity in charge. Consequently, the 
attainment and sustainment of a robust and synchronized partnership between 
California’s fusion centers is dependent upon each center’s commitment to 
collaborate. Current research has focused largely on building collaboration within 
fusion centers, as opposed to between fusion centers.  
This research seeks to identify the appropriate role and mission of 
California’s state fusion center as it relates to strengthening stakeholder 
relationships, collaboration, and sustainability, through the analysis of data 
captured from California’s regional centers, sheriffs and police chiefs, and 
examining the roles and methods of other state fusion centers in states with 
multiple centers. From this research, this thesis recommends a series of 
collaborative initiatives intended to help strengthen intra-state fusion center 
collaboration, more properly align state and regional fusion center efforts, and 
enhance sustainability through maintained relevancy and added value to 
stakeholders and customers.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Shortly before midnight on a pleasant April evening near Charleston, a 40-
year-old businessman borrowed a horse and began riding towards Lexington to 
deliver an important message. The businessman did not have access to a car, 
telephone, cell phone, or the Internet, so driving, phoning, texting, or “tweeting” 
the message was simply not an option. Fortunately, that urgent communication 
was delivered in time and has since been credited with helping change the 
course of American history. The April night in question was April 18, 1775, and 
that 40-year-old businessman was none other than silversmith and patriot, Paul 
Revere. His infamous midnight ride to warn patriots of an impending attack would 
prove vital to their success just hours later at the Battle of Lexington. 
More than 226 years later, millions of Americans and people throughout 
the world would watch in horror and disbelief as commercial aircraft, laden with 
fuel and unsuspecting passengers, were suddenly transformed into weapons and 
propelled into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing thousands in the 
aftermath. Regrettably, there would be no modern day Paul Revere to warn of 
these attacks in advance or prevent them from occurring. Much like the surprise 
attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 
revealed a nation caught off-guard by a strike against our homeland. While Paul 
Revere and his fellow patriots were successful in alerting others to the impending 
assault centuries earlier using “one if by land” or “two if by sea,” some would 
question where the corresponding “three if by air” warning was on 9/11? 
Moreover, what “four if” scenarios it is necessary to protect against in the future?  
As an outgrowth to these and similar questions, the formation of 
multiagency and multidisciplinary fusion centers has become an integral part of 
this country’s efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks and, in some ways, serve 
as a twenty-first century equivalent to Paul Revere. In fact, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano has described fusion 
centers as being “the centerpiece of state, local, and federal intelligence sharing 
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for the future” (Napolitano, 2009), and establishing a network of fusion centers 
across the United States (U.S.) remains one of the primary goals of DHS and the 
federal government (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 7). While 
considerable steps have been taken over the past several years to enhance the 
“baseline capabilities” of state and local fusion centers across the nation, 
including those in California, to be truly successful, fusion centers must also be 
capable of coordinating and collaborating effectively with other centers to avoid 
“information silos” or “stovepipes” from occurring within individual centers or 
states (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, p. 14). Accordingly, as fusion centers in California work to achieve 
recommended baseline capabilities throughout their respective operations (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), 
collectively, the state must also strive to achieve the next generation of fusion in 
California by aligning state and regional fusion centers into a more collaborative 
and synchronized statewide network.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since 9/11, a proliferation of state and local intelligence “fusion centers” 
has occurred throughout the nation in an effort to improve intelligence sharing 
and prevent terrorist attacks. The same is true in California. In fact, California 
currently has more DHS recognized fusion centers than any other state in the 
nation and is one of 10 states possessing multiple fusion centers (National 
Fusion Center Coordination Group, 2009). 
Shadowing the nation’s explosive growth of fusion centers has been an 
increasing number of federally sponsored publications intended to provide 
recommended fusion center “guidelines” and “baseline capabilities” for all centers 
to strive to attain (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008). Much of this effort has been intended to establish core 
competencies among all centers in hopes of laying the foundation for creating a 
national network of state and local fusion centers, as called for in the National 
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Strategy for Information Sharing (President of the United States, 2007, p. 11). 
Similar to this national effort, California too has sought to construct a robust and 
integrated network among its state and regional fusion centers (Governor's Office 
of Homeland Security, 2008). 
In March 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger designated the State Terrorism 
Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) as California’s primary state fusion center. 
The STTAC was created in 2005 as a cooperative effort between the Governor’s 
Office of Homeland Security (OHS), California Highway Patrol (CHP), and 
California Department of Justice (DOJ) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2007, p. 47) and replaced the former California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 
(CATIC). In addition to the STTAC, California has four Regional Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Centers (RTTACs)—located in Sacramento, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, and San Diego—whose operational boundaries coincide with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) four California field offices (Governor's 
Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 13). The STTAC and RTTACs are 
independently managed and operated and each is comprised of a varied 
assortment of multijurisdictional and multiagency participants from various 
federal, state, and/or local agencies. Under California’s present construct, the 
STTAC and RTTACs are intended to serve as the framework of California’s State 
Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS) (Governor's Office of Homeland 
Security, 2008, p. 13).  
As articulated in the 2008 California State Homeland Security Strategy, 
hereafter referred to as the State Strategy, the STTAS is intended to be a unified 
system and collaborative approach for gathering, analyzing, and sharing 
homeland security information (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 
13). While the State Strategy describes the STTAS as having “defined roles” and 
utilizing a “team approach” (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 
13), the Strategic Business Plan and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
developed for the STTAS in 2008 may not adequately provide the strategic vision 
necessary for integrating California’s state and regional fusion centers into a 
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highly efficient and collaborative statewide system. That deficiency is evidenced 
in part by all four RTTAC commanders requesting that the STTAS CONOPS be 
revisited, clarified, and updated with input from the RTTACs, STTAC, and other 
homeland security stakeholders to create a more efficient and well-defined 
statewide model (RTTAC commanders, personal communication, 2009).  
The lack of a current, comprehensive, and fully integrated STTAS 
CONOPS to assist California in more effectively synchronizing state and regional 
fusion center operations has been further complicated by management and 
personnel challenges in the STTAC that left it void of full-time law enforcement or 
multiagency participation for more than a year. While some of the associated 
personnel changes may have benefited individual RTTACs that received staff 
previously assigned to the STTAC, the absence of daily law enforcement 
management and multiagency participation within the STTAC negatively 
impacted its ability to collaborate with federal, state, and local stakeholders, 
including the RTTACs (Federal, state, and local homeland security professionals 
personal communication, 2008). In short, the lack of a fully implemented 
statewide plan, coupled with diminished collaboration between the STTAC and 
RTTACs, weakened the linkage between state and regional operations.  
In late 2008, meetings were held between senior management at CHP 
and OHS, now the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA), in 
which CHP was asked to consider taking over management of the STTAC 
(Senior executives at CHP and Cal EMA, personal communication, 2008). On 
October 1, 2009, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between 
CHP, Cal EMA, and California DOJ paving the way for CHP to assume command 
of the STTAC and have a full-time CHP and California DOJ presence in the 
center. As the CHP embarks upon this new leadership position, it is appropriate 
that the mission and role of the STTAC in creating a more synchronized network 




determine what changes, if any, may be appropriate. As the CHP sets out to 
rebuild participation and collaboration within the STTAC, the state must also 
heighten collaboration and integration among the STTAC and RTTACs. 
Although the current State Strategy commits to utilizing an “all hazards” 
approach towards protecting California, its citizens, and infrastructure 
(Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1), the STTAC’s primary focus 
to date has been limited to antiterrorism only (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 24). While the majority of fusion 
centers throughout the nation have since adopted an “all crimes” or “all hazards” 
mission (Rollins, 2008, pp. 21–22), including some of California’s RTTACs, the 
STTAC has not followed suit. The STTAC’s failure to do so may signal a possible 
misalignment with the evolving mission of the RTTACs and appears to run 
counter to federal guidance calling for fusion centers to consider adopting an all 
crimes or all hazards approach or justify their reasons for not doing so (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). 
Additionally, given the current threats facing California, the STTAC’s current 
“terrorism only” format may be insufficient and outdated. 
Although California has not experienced a significant terrorist attack on the 
scale of 9/11, the state has seen a rise in gang-related violence and other threats 
to public safety in its communities. The mounting drug-related bloodshed along 
the southern border with Mexico, for example, has highlighted the potential for 
“spillover” into California and other southwest border states. As California faces a 
projected $20 billion budget deficit for 2010, many public safety organizations 
throughout the state are facing layoffs, while at the same time, struggling to 
maintain essential services. Given the current public safety challenges facing 
California, the STTAC’s present mission, and potentially that of the STTAS, 
appears inadequate to handle the full range of threats currently facing public 




the current mission be reevaluated to determine the best strategy to support 
today’s physical, political, and financial challenges, while promoting effective 
interdisciplinary cooperation and providing enhanced value to the end-user.  
In analyzing appropriate models and methods for use in California, this 
thesis evaluates to what extent stakeholder relationships and collaboration must 
be developed to support the role of the STTAC and what steps must be taken to 
synchronize the collective efforts of the STTAC and RTTACs better as part of a 
sustainable and integrated statewide network. In doing so, this research 
examines how other states with multiple fusion centers are structured and 
evaluates the intelligence and information needs of law enforcement 
stakeholders throughout California in hopes of more effectively aligning fusion 
center capabilities with the needs of the end-users. Finally, this investigative 
inquiry explores intelligence centers abroad for possible lessons learned and 
carefully considers both scholarly and “real world” methods for strengthening 
trust and collaboration between California’s distributed network of fusion centers 
and establishing greater synergy throughout their collective efforts, while 
enhancing efficiency and sustainability for the future.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis hypothesizes that to create an effective statewide network of 
fusion centers, the roles and responsibilities of each center, as critical nodes in a 
network, must clearly be articulated and accepted by every participant, in 
addition to promoting an environment where collaboration can readily occur. 
Accordingly, in seeking to establish a more robust and integrated network of 
state and regional fusion centers in California, known as the STTAS, the primary 
research questions are:  
 What is the appropriate role of the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center within California’s State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment System?  
 What is the appropriate mission for the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center as it relates to strengthening stakeholder 
relationships? 
 7
 How do you maintain fusion center support and promote 
sustainability in an ever-changing political and economic 
environment? 
 How can horizontal “center-to-center” collaboration be strengthened 
between the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center and the 
Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research contributes to literature that presently lacks an informed 
examination of states having multiple fusion centers and the interrelationships 
between those centers. Specifically, this research supplies the following 
contributions of significance.  
 It highlights the current fusion center process in California and 
identifies suggested strategic modifications for California and 
potentially other states to consider in implementing an appropriate 
strategy and mission. 
 It identifies the intelligence needs of sheriffs and police chiefs from 
throughout California and, in doing so, offer guidance on how the 
services provided by fusion centers can be better aligned with the 
needs of the end user and other stakeholders as a means for 
increasing value, stakeholder support, and sustainability. 
 It underscores the expectations regional fusion centers have of the 
state center in terms of its role, mission, and services rendered and 
provide guidance on how states with multiple fusion centers can 
structure various roles, responsibilities, and stakeholder 
relationships to enable greater interagency cooperation, enhanced 
information sharing, and more effective synchronization of 
statewide fusion center operations.  
 It explores the role interagency cooperation and leadership has on 
collaboration and sustainability. 
D. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE, AND 
CHALLENGES 
To ensure California’s system of state and regional fusion centers is 
capable of supporting the current and future intelligence needs of the state, an 
evaluation of the appropriate fusion center mission, strategy, and stakeholder 
relationships must be undertaken. This assessment must review the intelligence 
requirements of public safety organizations in California in addressing current 
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and future threats, while articulating a sustainable vision for the STTAC to 
collaborate with other fusion centers effectively in California (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 23).  
Since the STTAC’s creation in 2005, several federal publications including 
Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban 
Fusion Centers have been produced in an effort to implement core competencies 
among present and future intelligence fusion centers across the United States 
(U.S). While the majority of fusion centers started with a counterterrorism focus, 
most have expanded their mission over the past two years to include “all crimes” 
or “all hazards” (Rollins, 2008, pp. 21–22). The STTAC, however, has continued 
to address “terrorism only,” even though escalating bloodshed along the 
southwest border with Mexico and increasing gang violence among many of 
California’s communities suggest that a broader range of threats could be 
considered as part of the STTAC’s strategic vision and mission to address. By 
formally evaluating the pros/cons of adopting an “all crimes” or “all hazards” 
center, this research helps identify the most effective model for California. Since 
the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Fusion Centers report calls 
for fusion centers electing not to adopt an “all crimes” or “all hazards” mission to 
justify their reasons as part of an annual evaluation (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 7), incorporating that 
assessment into a formal evaluation of state strategies would also help fulfill that 
requirement. 
For the STTAC to meet the intelligence needs of its clients successfully, 
which includes the RTTACs, the STTAC must first understand the needs of its 
clients (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, p. 23). Only then can the STTAC and the STTAS be thoughtfully structured 
in a manner to comprehend and support those intelligence needs fully. Absent 
such an assessment, the likelihood for gaps to exist between the needs of the 
consumer and the deliverables provided by the STTAC is increased, given the 
potential for unclear expectations or misunderstandings surrounding their 
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intelligence requirements. To be viable and successful in their mission, fusion 
centers must provide services and deliverables considered by various 
stakeholders to provide added value to their operations. Pragmatically, the 
determination of value ultimately rests in the hands of the end-user, who 
evaluates how meaningful the services provided by the STTAC are to their 
operations and decides whether to participate in the STTAC or act upon the 
information provided. The mere fact that a fusion center believes it is providing a 
valuable service to its clients is of little consolation if the clients themselves 
disagree with that assessment. To remain relevant, the STTAC must capture and 
sustain the support of its stakeholders or run the risk of losing its efficacy or 
sustainability either politically, financially, or through diminished staffing and 
resources. Ultimately, sustainability is tied to value. If stakeholders do not derive 
an increased value from the STTAC, they are less likely to participate with the 
STTAC or collectively align their operations. 
Finally, California must develop and implement effective procedures and 
plans to facilitate intrastate coordination among state and local fusion centers, 
including their roles and responsibilities as part of the state’s overall system (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 12). In 
doing so, current federal guidance strongly encourages that centers adopt a 
formal governance structure capable of promoting and maintaining a healthy and 
collaborative environment, while permitting stakeholders to have a voice in the 
development of the system (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 23).  
With the recent transfer of the STTAC’s management functions to the 
CHP, California must evaluate the appropriate role and mission of STTAC in 
facilitating and supporting a more synchronized network of state and regional 
fusion centers. To achieve the “fusion of fusion centers” successfully, the 
interrelationships between the STTAC and RTTACs must be cultivated and 




The research methodologies employed in this thesis include a 
comprehensive review of relevant literature and the following. 
1. Qualitative Analysis 
In preparation of taking over management of the STTAC, the CHP 
conducted surveys of local law enforcement agencies and the RTTACs. Using a 
qualitative analysis, this research methodology codes and analyzes data 
collected and made available by the CHP, as it relates to the following three 
areas. 
a. Survey of California Sheriffs and Police Chiefs 
Qualitative analysis of data obtained by the CHP from independent 
surveys of California sheriffs and police chiefs is performed in an effort to 
evaluate the intelligence needs of local law enforcement agencies, assess 
whether or not those needs are presently being met under the state’s current 
fusion center construct, and determine what modifications, if any, may be 
necessary for California’s fusion centers to provide a higher level of service to 
one of their primary end-users—public safety/law enforcement.  
b. Survey of California’s RTTACs 
Qualitative analysis of data acquired by the CHP from a survey of 
the four RTTAC commanders is done in an attempt to evaluate, among other 
things, their expectations of the STTAC as California’s designated state center, 
their current needs from the STTAC, and what modifications, if any, may be 
necessary to enhance collaboration between the RTTACs and the STTAC, 
increase the value of services provided by the STTAC to the RTTAC, and better 
align California’s state and regional fusion center operations. 
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2. Comparative Analysis 
a. State Fusion Centers in Other States Having Multiple 
State Fusion Centers  
A comparative analysis of data collected by the CHP from surveys 
of other state fusion centers in states having multiple centers is conducted to 
determine the most pervasive mission and structure, role of designated state 
fusion centers, and methods used to foster collaborative center-to-center 
operations. 
b. Joint Intelligence Centers in the United Kingdom and 
Germany 
A comparative analysis of intelligence centers in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Germany is conducted in an effort to identify alternative 
methods to consider when evaluating the mission of the STTAC and to explore 
how California might integrate the experiences and/or best practices of other 
nations into a more efficient, collaborative, and successful statewide structure.  
F. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Although the research methodology employed in this thesis examines the 
current intelligence requirements of California’s local law enforcement agencies 
and regional fusion centers as primary customers of the STTAC, it does not 
evaluate or take into consideration the needs of other federal, state, local, and 
private sector stakeholders such as fire, public health, other first responders, or 
local businesses. 
G. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
As highlighted in this introductory chapter, the primary focus of this thesis 
is to determine the appropriate role of the STTAC within California’s STTAS and 
to examine methods to build a more synchronized and collaborative network of 
fusion centers in California.  
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Chapter II summarizes the current literature on fusion centers, including 
their definition, history, varied missions, capabilities, funding, and sustainability. 
While this literature highlights the federal government’s desire to create a 
national network of fusion centers, it underscores the current lack of information 
surrounding states possessing multiple fusion centers, the interrelationships 
between state and local fusion centers, or methods for strengthening horizontal 
center-to-center collaboration among a distributed network of intrastate or 
interstate fusion centers.  
Chapter III provides an overview of California’s STTAS, which is 
comprised of the STTAC and RTTACs. This chapter offers a brief look at the 
intended purpose, structure, and governance of the STTAS. Additionally, it 
supplies an overview of the general roles and responsibilities of the STTAC and 
RTTACs.  
Chapter IV summarizes surveys of California sheriffs and police chiefs as 
primary customers of intelligence and other information provided by California’s 
fusion centers. In doing so, it examines their current interaction with fusion 
centers, threats impacting their communities, their stated intelligence 
requirements, and whether their current needs are being met by the types of 
intelligence and information they are currently receiving.  
Chapter V contains the author’s qualitative analysis of survey data 
captured from California’s RTTACs, as members of the STTAS. This chapter 
examines the current mission of each RTTAC, who they consider to be their 
primary customers, what role they believe the STTAC should play within the 
STTAS, and how the STTAC’s services could potentially afford greater value to 
the STTAS and their own operations.  
Chapter VI examines state fusion centers in other states having multiple 
fusion centers and provides a comparison of the specific roles, missions, 
customers, and services of the state fusion centers in Florida and Ohio, in 
comparison with the STTAC. This chapter also reviews the structure of the 
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statewide fusion center systems in Florida and Ohio, including the relationships 
and operational dynamics between the state and regional fusion centers in each 
of those states. 
Chapter VII includes the authors’ comparative analysis of joint intelligence 
centers in the United Kingdom and Germany and explores how each center’s 
mission, composition, governance, collaboration, information sharing, and 
funding might assist the STTAC and California’s STTAS in developing a more 
efficient, collaborative, and synchronized statewide network.  
Chapter VIII summarizes the author’s research surrounding the role of 
collaboration in fusion center operations. In doing so, it highlights the importance 
of interpersonal relationships and trust in building effective fusion center 
partnerships and summarizes this research into building and strengthening 
collaboration among dispersed organizational networks, such as the STTAS. 
Finally, Chapter IX contains the author’s summary and conclusions.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Shortly after 9/11, there was a call for greater collaboration and 
intelligence sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to 
help prevent future terrorist attacks against this nation (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 328). This early literature 
recognized the potential value of state and local law enforcement agencies as a 
force multiplier to strengthen federal efforts to safeguard our communities. In 
searching for a means to enhance collaboration and more effectively “connect 
the dots,” publications began discussing the possible benefits of creating 
multijurisdictional intelligence fusion centers as a new information-sharing 
paradigm between federal, state, and local agencies.  
While the early post-9/11 literature centered largely on fusion centers for 
the expressed purpose of counterterrorism, natural disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, broadened the literary discussion of fusion center roles and 
missions to include other criminal threats and hazards facing this nation. This 
post-Katrina period of literature also examined the benefits of incorporating other 
non-law enforcement stakeholders, such as public health and private sector 
organizations into the fusion center process. 
As the number of state and local fusion centers has grown, so too has the 
amount of literature offering suggested guidelines, recommendations, and best 
practices for fusion centers to consider. These publications have highlighted the 
need for establishing baseline capabilities among state and local fusion centers. 
They have also called for the creation of a national network of interconnected 
fusion centers across the country; however, very little research exists on existing 
“center-to-center” relationships among multiple fusion centers operating in the 
same state or methods for enhancing intra- or inter-state collaboration to help 
create the desired end state—an integrated system. 
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In addition to the themes already discussed, a growing volume of literature 
highlights public concerns over of the protection of civil liberties and the need for 
fusion centers to establish well-defined privacy policies that ensure full 
compliance with the U.S. Constitution and other federal and state regulations 
surrounding the lawful collection, use, and safekeeping of criminal intelligence. 
As federal, state, and local jurisdictions also face unprecedented economic 
shortfalls, some of the most recent literature on fusion centers questions the 
long-term implications a declining economy may pose to future funding and 
sustainability. While the nation’s economic future is still unclear, additional 
research into viable funding and sustainability options for fusion centers appears 
warranted. 
This literature review highlights a broad range of sources that have delved 
into various aspects of fusion centers since 9/11, including federal publications, 
investigative reports, congressional research and testimony, professional 
associations, policy institutes, journals, and periodicals. In doing so, the following 
topical areas are explored: (1) material regarding the development and definition 
of state and local intelligence fusion centers; (2) national strategies and guidance 
documents discussing the strategic role fusion centers can play in mitigating 
threats by employing a counterterrorism, “all crimes,” or “all hazards” mission; (3) 
national and academic journals discussing future funding and sustainability 
factors impacting a large percentage of fusion centers across the nation; and (4) 
literature underscoring the role of collaboration in fusion center operations and 
among fusion center participants. 
B. FUSION CENTERS—DEFINITION AND HISTORY 
Fusion centers are defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more 
agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information…with the goal of 
maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal 
and terrorist activity” (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006, p. 47).. This definition appears widely accepted, as it is cited by 
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numerous federal publications (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 
1) and is contained in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322, 2007).  
The impetus for developing state and local fusion centers began shortly 
after 9/11. This effort kicked-off slowly in a handful of states, resulting in the 
creation of nine fusion centers within the first two years after 9/11 (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 6), one of which was the former 
California Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC). As publications began 
discussing the development of state fusion centers and the possible benefits this 
new counterterrorism tool may offer, other states quickly sought to establish 
fusion centers of their own. In fact, annual surveys of state homeland security 
directors ranked the establishment of a state fusion center among each state’s 
top five priorities for several years straight (National Governors Association 
Center for Best Practices, 2007) and that trend has continued in the most recent 
survey conducted in 2008 (National Governors Association Center for Best 
Practices, 2009). The explosive growth of fusion centers over the subsequent 
two-and-a-half year period—January 2004 through mid-2007—is chronicled in a 
federal report highlighting the additional 34 fusion centers established during that 
time period (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 6). While the total 
number of state and major urban area fusion centers nationwide grew to 58 in 
2007 (President of the United States, 2007, p. 8) and remained unchanged 
through April 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2008, p. 5), by April 2009 the total number of centers rose 
sharply to 70 (Riegle, 2009). Of those 70 centers, 50 are designated state fusion 
centers and 20 are regional or local centers located in major urban areas across 
the nation (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). 
Recently, two more local fusion centers were added to those previously 
recognized by DHS, bringing the actual total to 72 (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009). Remarkably, almost half of the fusion centers in existence today 
have been created since 2006 (Riegle, 2009).  
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C. FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES AND BASELINE CAPABILITIES 
As states began “standing up” fusions center in the aftermath of 9/11, they 
initially did so without the benefit of having recommended standards or guidelines 
from which to draw upon (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006, p. 1). This gap in fusion center guidance existed in 
large part through the end of 2005, and the lack of common standards resulted in 
many first generation fusion centers becoming information “silos,” as they 
experienced significant communication and interoperability hurdles that made 
information sharing inefficient (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006, p. 1). As these early centers attempted to navigate 
their way through unchartered territory, DOJ and DHS formed a series of focus 
groups in hopes of developing recommended guidelines and procedures to assist 
current and prospective fusion centers in their ability to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence information more effectively (U.S. Department of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 2). The result of their combined 
efforts was the creation of Fusion Center Guidelines in 2006, which encouraged 
leaders to adopt 18 recommended “guidelines” intended to promote the 
seamless integration and management of state and local fusion centers (U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, pp. iii–7). 
Among other things, these guidelines recommended that fusion centers 
collaboratively develop their mission and goals, establish a governance structure 
and MOUs, create a collaborative sharing environment, adopt formal privacy and 
security agreements, establish common information sharing and communication 
protocols, and develop a process by which to measure their performance (U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, pp. 5–7).  
In September 2008, a supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines, 
entitled Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 
hereafter referred to as Baseline Capabilities, was produced in hopes of 
advancing minimum “baseline” performance standards for all fusion centers to 
attain (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, 
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pp. 1–3). In a survey of state homeland security directors conducted in 2008, 
almost 80 percent of those surveyed claimed their fusion centers complied with 
the recommended baseline capabilities (National Governors Association Center 
for Best Practices, 2009, pp. 6–7). While self-reported, that seemingly high level 
of compliance has not been independently verified. DHS has estimated it could 
take up to five years for every fusion center to attain all of the baseline 
capabilities either directly or by leveraging the capabilities of another center or 
organization in their jurisdiction (Riegle, 2009).  
In addition to addressing process-related capabilities, Baseline 
Capabilities also promotes baseline administrative capabilities designed to 
ensure the proper management and oversight of state and local fusion centers 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 9). 
In terms of process-related competencies, the report provides recommended 
standards in the areas of planning, information collection, information processing, 
analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation—all parts of the intelligence process 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 9). 
The very first capability discussed under the category of planning involves the 
need for states to establish effective intrastate coordination among state and 
local fusion centers and to identify each center’s roles and responsibilities as part 
of a statewide effort (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 12). Additionally, these planning guidelines recommend centers 
identify and prioritize local risks and information requirements, on both a 
statewide and regional basis, to align fusion center efforts properly (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 12–13). 
To help maintain that alignment, centers are encouraged to solicit recurring 
stakeholder feedback as part of the reevaluation process and to incorporate that 
feedback into their operations, while also reevaluating risks, needs, and 
strategies on a routine basis (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 21). 
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In deference to administrative functions, Baseline Capabilities offers 
guidance regarding fusion center management and governance, privacy 
protection, information security, personnel and training, technology, and funding 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 9). 
In doing so, these tenets advocate that centers adopt a governance structure 
inclusive of disciplines and jurisdictions from within the centers’ areas of 
responsibility, including state and local law enforcement and other public safety 
entities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 23). Additionally, this doctrine recommends the governance body 
include representation from other fusion centers in the state to foster greater 
collaboration and further clarify the roles of each center as part of a statewide 
system (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 24). Governance bodies are also encouraged to consider adopting an all 
crimes and/or all hazards mission and to establish stakeholder inclusive 
processes to help achieve a collaborative environment—both of which are 
discussed in further detail later in this literature review (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 23–25).  
Since its release in 2008, Baseline Capabilities has, in essence, become 
the pseudo “bible” for fusion center management, as evidenced by the theme of 
the 2009 National Fusion Center Conference; appropriately called “Achieving 
Baseline Capabilities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). For 
FY2010, federal homeland security grant funding awarded to state and local 
fusion centers must support the “development of a statewide fusion process” and 
comply with Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 90). To help ensure compliance, 
some organizations have called for the creation of a formal certification process 
to verify fusion center attainment of Baseline Capabilities (CNA Analysis & 
Solutions, undated).  
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D. MISSION–COUNTERTERRORISM, ALL CRIMES, OR ALL HAZARDS? 
Since the risks and challenges facing states and communities nationwide 
are often unique, so too are the 72 fusion centers currently operating in the 
United States. Each center has a specific mission and design tailored to the 
specific needs of the jurisdictions it serves (Allen, 2006, pp. 3–4). While some 
fusion centers subscribe to a purely counterterrorism focus, others have elected 
to broaden their scope of operations to what is commonly referred to as an “all 
crimes” or “all hazards” mission. Practically speaking, the term “all crimes” 
generally refers to terrorism and other high-risk criminal offenses, including 
potential precursor crimes with a plausible nexus to terrorism or some other 
criminal enterprise. It is not an indication that the center is to attend to every 
conceivable criminal act, including minor offenses (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 43). The term “all hazards,” on the 
other hand, most often refers to fusion centers that have prioritized certain 
disasters or emergencies likely to occur within their respective jurisdiction, 
beyond that of terrorism or serious crime, and includes the analysis and 
distribution of information relative to such incidents as a part of their overall 
mission (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 43). Once again, the term “all hazards” is not an indication that the 
center supports every type of disaster, especially if such risks are of low 
probability for the involved jurisdiction (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). 
Although the majority of post-9/11 fusion centers began with a 
counterterrorism mission, most have expanded that mission within the past two 
years to include all crimes or all hazards (Rollins, 2008, p. 21). The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) supports this migration towards an all 
crimes approach, given the fact that since 9/11, over eight million Americans 




(International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2008, pp. 3, 5). These dramatic 
statistics underscore the seriousness of violent crime and the impact it has on the 
safety of U.S. communities.  
In recent years, a growing number of federal guidance documents have 
also encouraged fusion centers to adopt an all crimes or all hazards mission 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 4). In addition to addressing a broader 
range of threats—including terrorism—research suggests that adopting an all 
crimes format may also increase support from law enforcement agencies and the 
public (Rollins, 2008, p. 87). That assertion is supported by a report written by 
the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association encouraging the development of all 
crimes fusion centers (Major Cities Chiefs Association, Homeland Security 
Committee, 2008, p. 4), as well as comments made by former Los Angeles 
Police Chief William Bratton while addressing the National Fusion Center 
Conference in 2008, supporting an all crimes approach (Bratton, 2008). Finally, 
recommendations stemming from the 2007 National Intelligence Sharing Summit 
also advocate all crimes fusion centers as the most appropriate model (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 4).  
As mentioned previously, an all hazards mission includes active 
preparation for certain potential disasters in addition to terrorism and crime (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 24–25) 
and enables agencies to share intelligence regarding natural and manmade 
disasters (Harris, 2008). Fusion centers adopting an all hazards format are often 
more likely to include additional non-law enforcement personnel, such as fire, 
public health, and other first responders (Rollins, 2008, p. 32). Over 40 percent of 
fusion centers nationwide commonly refer to themselves as all hazards centers 
and a similar percentage consider themselves all crimes (Rollins, 2008, p. 22).  
As discussed earlier in this literature review, Baseline Capabilities calls for 
each fusion center to decide whether to adopt an all crimes and/or all hazards 
format (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 7). Fusion centers electing not to implement an all crimes or all hazards 
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model must provide their written justification for doing so as part of an annual 
assessment (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 7). While the majority of fusion centers nationwide call 
themselves all crimes or all hazards centers, which a mounting volume of 
literature has encouraged as a more sustainable model (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007, p. 3), almost 15 percent of the centers in existence 
today continue to focus on counterterrorism alone (Rollins, 2008, p. 21).  
E. THE MIGRATION TOWARD MULTIPLE FUSION CENTERS 
Over the past few years, numerous states have established multiple fusion 
centers, including California (Rollins, 2008, p. 20). California is currently one of 
10 states to operate multiple fusion centers, and it currently has more DHS 
recognized centers than any other state (National Fusion Center Coordination 
Group, 2009). In 2008, governors were asked to designate one fusion center in 
each state to serve as the primary federal point of contact due to the growing 
number of states with more than one center (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2008, p. 45). In California, that 
designated center is the STTAC. 
Although the number of states with multiple fusion centers has increased, 
very little has been written regarding the roles, missions, working relationships, or 
operational structures that currently exist between state and regional centers. 
Some have argued this lack of research stems from the short tenure of multiple 
fusion centers, and the fact these relationships have not been thoroughly 
assessed (Rollins, 2008, p. 21). The limited literature regarding this topic has 
highlighted that while some state and regional fusion centers work well together, 
others at times, appear to compete with one another (Rollins, 2008, pp. 20–21).  
As articulated earlier in this review, Fusion Center Guidelines and 
Baseline Capabilities do highlight the importance for states to identify and 
structure the intrastate coordination of state and local fusion centers and to 
determine their roles and responsibilities (U.S. Department of Homeland 
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Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 12). They also call for adopting a 
governance structure inclusive of representatives from other centers to help 
further clarify state and regional tasks (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 24). While these publications offer 
theoretical guidance of the importance of defining state and local missions, very 
little research has been done on the practical application of these tenets between 
multiple centers whose missions, participants, and self interests may be entirely 
different or whose operations are not in close proximity to one another.  
In a survey conducted by the National Governors Association in 2008, 
state homeland security directors from across the nation listed “coordinating state 
and local efforts,” including the advancement of interagency synchronization, as 
the number one homeland security-related priority for their states (National 
Governors Association Center for Best Practices, 2009, p. 4). While not directly 
mentioned in the context of that finding, enhancing state and local fusion center 
operations appears consistent with that stated priority.  
More research is needed in this area, as the principles for building 
effective working relationships between state and local fusion centers are 
essential for effective information sharing and may also extend to the 
establishment of a nationwide network of fusion centers to enhance information 
sharing; a stated objective of the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
(President of the United States, 2007, p. 11). Such research may help states with 
multiple fusion centers—such as California—identify smart practices for 
enhancing stakeholder relationships, fostering effective multi-layered integration, 
and instilling greater synergy.  
F. FUNDING AND SUSTAINABILITY  
Given this country’s unprecedented economic downturn, it is not surprising 
to find that a growing segment of recent literature surrounding fusion centers has 
discussed funding and sustainability concerns. In its examination of 58 fusion 
centers, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that 54 of the 58 
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centers reported experiencing funding challenges and concerns (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 2). The DHS Office of Inspector 
General notes that funding gaps remain a major concern as state and local 
officials examine ways to sustain fusion center operations (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2008, p. 27). In fact, nearly 
two-thirds of state homeland security directors surveyed in 2007 indicated that 
their state would be unable to continue fusion center operations without ongoing 
federal funding (National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, 2007, 
p. 1). In addition, only one-quarter of those surveyed in 2008 believed they could 
supplant fusion center funding were federal support reduced or eliminated 
(National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, 2009, p. 6). The 
potential implications of insufficient funding are perhaps no more clearly 
illustrated than by the Web site of the East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group 
(EBTEWG), located within the San Francisco Bay Area, which states, “due to 
funding cuts, effective December 31, 2008, the East Bay Terrorism Early 
Warning Group has ceased to exist” (East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, 
2008).  
Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff indicated in 2007 that grant 
funding for fusion centers was intended to increase baseline capabilities and not 
to fund their sustainment (Rollins, 2008, p. 44). With that said, the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council has recommended that DHS continue to provide 
funding and personnel support to fusion centers (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2008, p. 8). The current level of 
federal funding support to state and local fusion centers ranges between zero 
and 100 percent, with the average center deriving approximately 31 percent of its 
current funding from federal grant funds (Rollins, 2008, p. 34). Between fiscal 
years (FY) 2004 and 2007, DHS provided more than $254 million to support state 
and local fusion centers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2008, p. 7), and that number has reached in excess of $327  
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million from FY2004 through FY2008 (Bain, 2009). While many centers are 
dependent on this funding, others fear that continued federal support will result in 
federal mandates; thereby, restricting local control (Rollins, 2008, p. 32).  
The literature highlighted thus far has focused on funding and 
sustainability as it relates to sufficient financial support. Publications have also 
outlined DHS’s efforts to sustain fusion centers through the addition of DHS 
funded intelligence personnel, and a segment of research has also explored 
sustainability from the context of ongoing political, professional, and community 
support in the form of staffing, facilities, and other essential resources. In regards 
to DHS personnel support, Congress has allocated $10 million annually through 
2012 for the expressed purpose of funding DHS intelligence officer positions to 
help support fusion center operations (Public Law 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 
322, 2007). DHS currently has 36 intelligence specialists working in fusion 
centers throughout the U.S. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009) and 
hopes to have a representative assigned to all 72 designated centers by the end 
of FY2010 (Information Sharing Environment, 2009, p. 21). 
As previously discussed in the context of each fusion center’s mission, 
research suggests that “all crimes” fusion centers are more inclined to receive 
greater support from law enforcement agencies. Additionally, those centers 
electing to adopt an “all hazards” model may be more successful in obtaining 
staff participation and support from other non-law enforcement agencies, such as 
public health and fire departments. Although this may imply that such efforts by 
their very design may help to provide these centers greater support, very little 
direct research appears to address what proactive steps fusion centers can take 
to strengthen their sustainability and make themselves more valuable to the 
federal, state, and local agencies they support and the communities they serve.  
The majority of literature couches the sustainability of fusion centers 
largely from the standpoint of physical, “co-located” facilities. Co-located fusion 
centers may be more desirable, as they provide direct physical access to 
participating agencies, fosters greater communication, and can increase the 
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efficiency of intelligence and information sharing (U.S. Department of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 47). Very little research, 
however, appears to have been done on the feasibility of “virtual” fusion centers 
in which staff may physically reside within their respective agencies, but still have 
connectivity between each other to facilitate information sharing. One recent 
report does highlight the possible benefits of establishing “virtual fusion centers” 
that can be accessed by law enforcement officers via the Web (U.S. Department 
of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 19). While this 
research is offered as a technological improvement to help expand law 
enforcement’s access to information rather than supplant existing fusion centers, 
further research in this area may provide valuable alternatives for centers facing 
staffing shortages, inadequate facilities, or possible elimination due to funding 
and/or staffing constraints.  
G. FUSION CENTER COLLABORATION  
Fusion Center Guidelines asserts that collaboration is a vital tool in 
establishing trusted partnerships and maximizing efficiencies within and among 
state and local fusion centers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, p. 12). To be truly effective, fusion centers must 
“pull together” collectively toward a common purpose (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 12). In fact, Fusion 
Center Guidelines maintains, “fusion centers embody the core of collaboration” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 
12).  
One of the principles of successful fusion center collaboration is to provide 
added value to the customer, participants, and other community stakeholders 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 
30). To do so, fusion centers must first develop an environment among 
participants in which trust is present in large measure (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29). Building trust often 
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begins with the development of effective interpersonal relationships (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29) that 
stem from individuals or agencies having the opportunity to work together side-
by-side in a collocated facility towards a common goal or mission (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005, p. 9).  
In an environment of increasing demand and diminishing resources, fusion 
centers are intended to serve as the center of collaboration through the sharing 
of resources and the creation of trusted interpersonal relationships (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 4). 
Some research suggests that collaboration, relationships, and linkages between 
fusion centers are stronger among centers that are closely located or have 
similar capabilities, as these centers tend to communicate with each other more 
often (Rollins, 2008, p. 76). The challenge becomes how to build similar trust and 
interpersonal relationships among centers and their respective staffs that are not 
co-located and, in actuality, may be hundreds of miles apart. The current body of 
knowledge on fusion centers fails to offer pragmatic solutions for creating trust, 
interpersonal relationships, and collaboration among separated fusion center 
personnel and facilities.  
The benefits of diverse multidisciplinary and multiagency participation in 
promoting stronger interpersonal relationships and collaboration within fusion 
centers are illustrated by the findings of a 2008 report by the DHS Office of 
Inspector General, which examined the impact of placing DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) officers within state and local fusion centers. The 
independent review found the majority of centers with DHS I&A officers assigned 
reported experiencing major improvements in their interaction, relationship, and 
collaboration with DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2008, p. 37). Conversely, centers that did not have an 
assigned I&A officer reported having greater difficulties in their relationship and 
interaction with DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2008, pp. 37–38). Furthermore, the physical presence of I&A 
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staff in state and local fusion centers was credited with helping to synchronize 
the flow of information and more effectively coordinate efforts between DHS and 
those fusion centers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2008, p. 37). These findings are supported by independent 
research that also concluded a collocation of agencies tends to improve the 
relationship and collaboration between agencies (Rollins, 2008, p. 36). 
In the context of creating collaborative partnerships, one report offering 
recommendations to Congress acknowledges that in some instances the 
relationships between federal, state, and regional partnerships are not as robust 
as they are publicly portrayed (Rollins, 2008, p. 82). Also, a tendency still exists 
for some centers and agencies to view others as “customers,” as opposed to fully 
integrated and collaborative “partners” (Rollins, 2008, p. 82). Recently, DHS 
Secretary Napolitano announced the creation of a Joint Fusion Center Program 
Management Office within DHS intended to strengthen fusion center capabilities, 
foster a greater sense of common purpose, and increase peer-to-peer 
relationships, which she describes as “the cornerstones of active and vibrant 
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III. CALIFORNIA’S STATE TERRORISM THREAT 
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
While briefly introduced to California’s State Terrorism Threat Assessment 
System (STTAS) in Chapter I of this thesis, this chapter provides a more detailed 
look at the overall purpose, structure, governance of the STTAS, in addition to a 
general overview of the individual roles and responsibilities of its participants. 
Having an informed understanding of the current STTAS structure offers a 
foundation for future chapters when reviewing what the appropriate mission for 
the California’s state fusion center should be and exploring methods for 
strengthening stakeholder relationships and collaboration within the STTAS to 
improve California’s network of state and regional fusion centers.  
B. OVERVIEW 
California’s STTAS is intended to safeguard the state from terrorist and 
other criminal threats by collaboratively analyzing and sharing information among 
various partners, through a unified system (Governor's Office of Homeland 
Security, 2008, p. 13). As mentioned earlier, the STTAS is comprised of the State 
Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC), California’s designated state 
fusion center, and four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers 
(RTTACs) located in Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. 
While the four regional centers are generically referred to as RTTACs within the 
STTAS, at least three of the four centers have adopted alternative names within 
their respective regions. For example, the Sacramento RTTAC is referred to as 
the Central California Intelligence Center (CCIC), the San Francisco RTTAC 
operates as the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), and 
the Los Angeles RTTAC is more commonly known as the Los Angeles Joint 
Regional Intelligence Center (LA JRIC). 
The STTAC and four RTTACs are independently operated, each having 
its own governance and management structure. The four RTTACs’ respective 
areas of responsibility are geographically aligned with the boundaries of the four 
current FBI regions within California, (see Figure 1). Collectively, the STTAC and 
RTTACs are intended to serve as part of a “unified” system with “defined roles” 
and a “team approach,” according to the State of California Homeland Security 
Strategy (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 13)  
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of California’s RTTACs (From: Los Angeles Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center) 
Presently, the STTAS lacks any legislative charter or legal mandate and, 
as such, can perhaps best be described as a voluntary relationship in which all 




of a statewide effort or system. In doing so, each center is an equal and 
“horizontal” partner within the STTAS, as there is no hierarchical structure or 
empowered authority in charge of the overall system. 
C. STRATEGIC BUSINESS PLAN/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The current Strategy Business Plan or Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
for the STTAS serves as the principal document for outlining the mutually agreed 
upon roles and responsibilities of the STTAS and its members. The CONOPS, as 
stated in its preface, is intended to be a “living” document reviewed annually by 
each of the participants to determine if any changes or modifications are 
warranted (Unknown, 2008). While calling for an annual review, the STTAS 
CONOPS does not specify a formal process by which such a review is to take 
place, identify how participants can petition for a requested modification, or 
outline the process on how requested changes are to be evaluated or decided. 
With the most recent version of the CONOPS being adopted in 2008, the 
commanders of the STTAC and RTTACs have each requested that the STTAS 
CONOPS be revisited, modified, and updated (STTAC and RTTAC commanders, 
personal communication, 2009). In fact, recent efforts have been made to 
schedule a meeting between the STTAC, RTTACs, Cal EMA, DHS, FBI, and 
other critical stakeholders for that precise purpose (STTAS executives, personal 
communication, 2010). 
D. GOVERNANCE  
As articulate in the STTAS CONOPS, no governing board or command 
structure currently oversees the STTAS. In fact, the CONOPS acknowledges that 
the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the STTAS alliance is “wholly dependent 
on” the cooperation and collaboration demonstrated by its participants (Unknown, 
2008). Were collaboration and cooperation to remain universally high among all 
participants, some might argue that the current structure is sufficient. However, 
should collaboration or cooperation diminish or vary, agency by agency, or  
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should disputes arise among one or more of the participants, the lack of a formal 
governance process may make resolution of those differences difficult, if not 
impossible, absent some formal method of redress.  
Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities advocate that fusion 
centers establish a formal governance structure that includes appropriate 
representation by each of the participants; representatives from other fusion 
centers operating within the state (if applicable); and representatives of federal 
agencies in at least an advisory capacity (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 23–24). Additionally, establishing 
bylaws, feedback mechanisms, and formal procedures are also recommended 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 
24). While the STTAC and RTTACs have formally established governance 
structures on an individual basis for their respective fusion center operations, the 
STTAS as a consortium of centers, presently lacks such a formal governance 
structure. 
E. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The State of California Homeland Security Strategy and the STTAS 
CONOPS provide a brief description of the various roles and responsibilities of 
the STTAC and RTTAC as part of the STTAS. The author’s intent in this section 
is to provide the reader with a general understanding of the common roles and 
responsibilities of members within the STTAS as articulated in various state 
plans. It is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of individual tasks, nor an 
assessment of whether or not all of the stated functions are being currently or 
adequately performed. They are merely offered as a “snapshot” of what current 
planning documents indicate regarding the STTAS, some of which may be dated. 
Any observed inconsistencies between the stated and actual functions of the 
STTAC and/or RTTACs related to this thesis is discussed in subsequent 
chapters, as appropriate.  
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1. STTAC 
As enumerated in California’s Homeland Security Strategy, the STTAC is 
intended to perform, among other things, the following roles and responsibilities 
(Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 15). 
 Serve as California’s primary point of contact with the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Operations Center 
(NOC), and the DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Unit 
 Provide “statewide analysis products, pattern-analysis products, 
geographic report linkages, state intelligence products, and regional 
investigative support throughout California” 
 Offer “comprehensive and dynamic statewide threat assessment 
capabilities;” to assist the governor and others with needed 
information to set appropriate policies and/or allocate necessary 
resources 
 Monitor global and national events with a potential nexus to 
California and provide situation awareness for California’s 
leadership 
 Provide support to the RTTACs and other partners 
Additionally, the STTAC is intended to provide senior state leaders with 
situational awareness on identified threats and help coordinate with various 
critical infrastructures throughout California (Bettenhausen, 2008).  
2. RTTACs 
A general description of the RTTACs’ general roles and responsibilities is 
also outlined in California’s Homeland Security Strategy. That Strategy was 
authored by the governor’s former Office of Homeland Security (OHS), which 
was recently reorganized within California’s Emergency Management Agency 
(Cal EMA). For purposes of this general overview, it is important to note that the 
general RTTAC duties outlined below are as stated in California’s Homeland 
Security Strategy and, as such, they may or may not reflect each RTTAC’s own 
understanding of its respective roles and responsibilities. As reflected in the 
Strategy prepared by OHS in 2008, the RTTACs perform the following functions 
and responsibilities (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 15). 
 36
 Develop regional threat assessments 
 Provide analytical capabilities/functions 
 Serve as the regional terrorism liaison officer (TLO) coordinators 
 
 Interact with other stakeholders to “share information, reports, and 
other threat and warning products” 
 Provide support to regional critical infrastructure and key resource 
(CI/KR) programs 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As highlighted in this chapter, California’s STTAS is a voluntary versus a 
statutorily mandated system intended to create and maintain a collaborative 
network of state and regional fusion centers, in addition to other partners, to help 
protect California and its citizens from acts of terrorism and other threats. By its 
own admission, the current CONOPS and the entire STTAS structure is 
dependent upon the cooperation and collaboration of its participants, as the 
STTAC and four RTTACs are each autonomous and are equal partners in this 
endeavor. Unlike a hierarchical structure in which a specific individual or entity is 
in charge, the horizontal and independent nature of the business relationships 
among the STTAS participants appear fundamentally dependent upon a 
sustained willingness by each of the involved parties to collaborate effectively 
towards a common objective. Absent a desire and willingness to do so, it would 
appear that the STTAS would be little more than an acknowledgement of 
California having five independent fusion centers, each serving its own 
constituency. The apparent lack of a formal governance structure or mechanism 
through which operational differences, suggestions, or requested modifications 
can be formally considered, places an even greater burden on the individual 
participants to somehow “work out” their challenges informally amongst 
themselves. Given the important role collaboration plays in sustaining this 
system, future chapters explore the impact of collaboration in greater detail, as 
well as methods to increase horizontal collaboration and stakeholder 
relationships among the participants within the STTAS.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA FROM FUSION CENTER 
CUSTOMERS: CALIFORNIA SHERIFFS AND POLICE CHIEFS 
Quality in a service or product is not what you put into it. 
It is what the client or customer gets out of it. 
Peter Drucker 
 
Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities both emphasize the 
importance of fusion centers identifying the needs of their customers and 
developing intelligence services and products to address those needs (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, pp. 5, 7). 
As the CHP prepared to assume management of the STTAC in late 2009, the 
department conducted a survey of California’s sheriffs and police chiefs—two of 
the primary customers of state and regional fusion centers. The survey was 
intended to evaluate the intelligence requirements of local law enforcement 
agencies in California, whether those needs were presently being supported by 
the STTAC and, in the end, improve STTAC services and operations. This 
chapter analyzes the results of the CHP’s survey, and the author wants to 
acknowledge the CHP for making their survey data available for the expressed 
purpose of conducting this qualitative analysis. 
The CHP disseminated the survey to all 58 county sheriffs and to 336 
police chiefs across California with the assistance of the California State Sheriffs 
Association (CSSA) and California Police Chiefs Association (CPCA). In 
examining the data acquired by the CHP, a total of 29 survey responses were 
received from sheriffs and 88 from police chiefs, representing a 50 percent and 
26 percent participation rate, respectively. The CHP captured no discerning 
information regarding the identities of the respondents or their respective 
agencies, in an effort to avoid attribution. Only a generic quantifier was utilized, 
which identified respondents as either sheriffs or police chiefs.  
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In coding and analyzing the raw data, the author identified several themes 
regarding the general categories of the information being assessed through the 
CHP’s survey questions. The following themes or categories identified in the 
questions and responses, which are used for purposes of this qualitative 
analysis, are summarized as follows: (a) baseline assessment of fusion center 
access and value; (b) assessing contemporary threats and intelligence needs; (c) 
evaluating needs versus deliverables; (d) preferred mission for the STTAC and 
preferred frequency of products to support local law enforcement; and (e) future 
support and sustainability. Appendix A contains a complete record of the survey 
questions. 
A. BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF FUSION CENTER ACCESS AND VALUE 
 Question: Does your agency receive terrorism related information 
or intelligence from your regional or local intelligence fusion center 
on an ongoing basis? 
More than three-quarters of the sheriffs and police chiefs who responded 
to the CHP’s survey revealed that their agencies do receive terrorism-related 
threat information and intelligence from their local RTTACs on a recurring basis 
(see Figure 2). The data suggests the RTTACs have been effective in 
establishing a large customer base among local law enforcement agencies and 
that access to fusion center products by those agencies appears fairly 
widespread.  
 Figure 2.   Percentage of Agencies Receiving Intelligence 
 Question: To the best of your knowledge has your agency ever 
interacted with or received intelligence information from California’s 
State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC)? 
When questioned by the CHP regarding their relationship with the STTAC, 
a lower percentage of sheriffs and police chiefs reported having agency 
interaction with or receiving intelligence information from the STTAC (see Figure 
3). This finding was not entirely unexpected given the current fusion center 
construct in California, in which primary contact with sheriffs and police 
departments is largely a function of the RTTACs. While slightly more than 50 
percent of police chiefs and almost three-quarters of the sheriffs reported having 
had at least some interaction with the STTAC, the data suggests that more 





Figure 3.   Percentage of Agencies Interacting with the STTAC 
 Question: If your agency currently receives terrorism information or 
intelligence from your fusion center, generally speaking, how useful 
has that information been to your department? 
In assessing the value of intelligence and information currently being 
provided by fusion centers to local law enforcement agencies, over 90 percent of 
sheriffs and almost 85 percent of police chiefs rated the information as being 
“somewhat useful” or “useful” to their respective agencies (see Figure 4). The 
data from the CHP survey suggests that the RTTACs are routinely providing their 
law enforcement customer base with information that the sheriffs and police 
departments consider valuable or useful to their operations. The fact that roughly 
half of the respondents categorized the information as “somewhat useful” 
suggests that local law enforcement agencies may be desirous of additional 
information, intelligence, or other factors to increase the usefulness of products 
they receive. Independent surveys by the RTTACs and STTAC as part of an 
ongoing reevaluation process may offer further insight into what additional 
information, modifications, or features can enhance the value of their deliverables 
and result in a larger segment of their customers increasing their responses from 
“somewhat useful” to “useful” or “very useful” (U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005, p. 21). Soliciting comments and input from 
fusion center consumers is consistent with federal guidance suggesting that 
fusion centers implement an ongoing feedback process to assess the value of 
information being offered and to seek recommendations for improving center 
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deliverables (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 16). The author noted from the CHP’s survey data that none of 
the sheriffs and only eight percent of the police chiefs categorized the information 
currently received from fusion centers as being “not useful.” This low percentage 
is a strong indication that most law enforcement agencies are in fact benefiting 
from the information they receive.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Usefulness of Intelligence and Information 
When specifically asked by the CHP how fusion center information could 
be made more useful to their agencies, most referenced the need for more 
specific, detailed, and timely information instead of information that has already 
been reported on “CNN.” The author noted several comments asserting that 
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information provided was often too general or readily available through the 
mainstream media and newspapers. Some of the respondents requested more 
regionally specific, direct, and actionable intelligence regarding threats with which 
local law enforcement should be concerned. While these comments offer insights 
into how the value of intelligence products can be further enhanced, full 
implementation of a reevaluation process for customers could glean additional 
insights. 
B. ASSESSING CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND INTELLIGENCE 
NEEDS 
 Question: Given the current public safety threats facing your 
community, what do you feel are your primary intelligence needs, 
based on the following categories? (See Appendix A for 
categories.) 
When surveyed by the CHP regarding the categories of crimes posing the 
most significant safety risks to their respective communities, and when 
questioned regarding their primary intelligence needs in relation to those threats, 
sheriffs and police chiefs both rated terrorism as “important,” but revealed the 
“most important” threats facing their communities and their greatest intelligence 
needs involve gangs, narcotics, and weapons, in descending order (see Figure 
5).  
In analyzing the survey data obtained by the CHP, it appears the 
prioritized community threats and intelligence needs, as rated independently by 
sheriffs and police chiefs, support the need for the STTAC and RTTACs to 
evaluate whether an all crimes mission can provide added value to local law 
enforcement agencies in addressing their current threat picture.  
With almost 50 percent of sheriffs and 60 percent of police chiefs 
identifying gangs as their single highest threat and intelligence need, the current 
“counterterrorism only” mission of the STTAC appears incapable of supporting, 
or at least it is not consistent with, local law enforcement’s stated primary, 
secondary, or tertiary intelligence requirements—gangs, narcotics, and weapons.  
  
 
Figure 5.   Primary Intelligence Needs of Chiefs and Sheriffs 
In regards to gangs, federal guidelines for establishing gang intelligence 
units and task forces recommend developing collaborative relationships between 
state and local fusion centers to enhance intelligence sharing and support (U.S. 
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Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 8). Additionally, in 
their review of fusion centers across the country, the General Accountability 
Office (GAO) noted several other state fusion centers are currently supporting 
gang-related intelligence needs, including North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
and Texas (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, pp. 49, 74, 99, 100). 
Baseline Capabilities also suggests centers establish a reevaluation process that 
helps to identify new threats and incorporates feedback into their operations 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 
21).  
As a result of local law enforcement’s prioritized threats and stated 
intelligence needs, current federal guidance surrounding the relationships 
between gang intelligence units and fusion centers, and the existence of other 
state fusion centers presently supporting gang-related intelligence, further 
evaluation of the STTAC’s current mission appears warranted. This observation 
is discussed in greater detail later in this analysis under the category of Preferred 
Mission, Methods, and Frequency to Support Law Enforcement.  
C. EVALUATING NEEDS VERSUS DELIVERABLES 
 Question: Based on your responses to [the previous question], are 
you satisfied that your current intelligence needs are being met to 
assist you in addressing the primary criminal threats facing your 
community? 
In evaluating whether or not the current intelligence needs of local law 
enforcement agencies are being met to help address the primary threats facing 
their communities, almost 40 percent of police chiefs and 55 percent of sheriffs 
reported to the CHP that fusion centers are satisfying their current intelligence 
needs (see Figure 6). Interestingly, almost 15 percent of police chiefs and 24 
percent of sheriffs were reportedly “not sure” whether their current intelligence 
needs are being fulfilled, suggesting that an updated assessment of their 
intelligence requirements may be desirable.  
 Figure 6.   Percentage of Agencies with Intelligence Needs Met 
Almost 38 percent of police chiefs and 21 percent of sheriffs suggested 
that their current intelligence needs are not being met in regards to principal 
criminal threats impacting their jurisdictions. When asked as part of the CHP’s 
survey what additional support they would like to see from the STTAC and 
RTTACs to address those concerns, the top three responses were determined to 
be as follows (based on my qualitative analysis of the CHP’s data): (a) the desire 
for more information and enhanced information sharing, (b) the need for greater 
communication, and (c) the request for additional intelligence support regarding 
gangs and to a lesser extent other criminal enterprises. At least two of the 
respondents acknowledged that their own agencies needed to show more 
initiative and be more engaged with their local fusion center. One chief 
expressed a desire to see more of a “tactical, operational, and strategic scope” 
for the types of information being provided by fusion centers and another chief 
called for the “ability to analyze and develop actionable intelligence” to assist 
them in becoming an intelligence led police organization.  
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Since fusion centers must offer a variety of products and services to meet 
their customers’ specific needs (Carter, 2009, p. 108) and establish processes to 
evaluate the value of products and services they offer (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 7), further evaluation of 
center services and deliverables should be performed on an ongoing basis to 
ensure proper alignment with the customer needs, whenever possible.  
D. PREFERRED MISSION FOR THE STTAC AND PREFERRED 
FREQUENCY OF PRODUCTS TO SUPPORT LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 Question: The state fusion center (STTAC) and four regional fusion 
centers throughout California are intended to work collaboratively 
together to help safeguard the state. In your opinion, what mission 
should the state fusion center (STTAC) undertake to help support 
your department and the regional center servicing your community? 
The STTAC and RTTACs are intended to work collaboratively together to 
help safeguard California. In an effort to determine the appropriate mission for 
the STTAC to perform in support of the RTTACs and local law enforcement 
agencies, the CHP sought the input of sheriffs and police chiefs (see Figure 7). In 
analyzing the CHP’s survey data, the majority of respondents related that an all 
crimes mission was most appropriate, with 62 percent of sheriffs and 58 percent 
of chiefs so indicating. Upon closer scrutiny of the CHP’s data, it appears that 
some of the respondents surveyed may have selected more than one response, 
such as “all crimes” and “all hazards.” This phenomenon appears limited to the 
responses received by the police chiefs, as the survey data collected from 
sheriffs contains one selection for each respondent. In analyzing the survey 
results of other possible formats, an “all hazards” mission is the second most 
popular format among sheriffs and chiefs, with “terrorism only” being a distant 
third.  
 Figure 7.   Recommended Mission for the STTAC  
These findings are consistent with independent research indicating that all 
crimes fusion centers help to establish greater buy-in among law enforcement 
agencies that are predominantly interested in criminal enterprises adversely 
impacting their communities, such as gangs, narcotics, and organized crime 
(Rollins, 2008, p. 21). As documented in the Literature Review (Chapter II), 
independent research derived from law enforcement agencies and professional 
law enforcement associations across the U.S. suggests widespread law 
enforcement support for all crimes fusion centers, which is consistent with the 
findings derived from the CHP’s survey. Even federal publications acknowledge 





terrorism and other criminal activity, such as gangs, narcotics trafficking, etc. 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 
43). 
 Question: How would you rate the frequency of intelligence 
information you receive from your regional or local fusion center via 
the following methods? (See Appendix A for choices.) 
When questioned by the CHP regarding the manner and frequency in 
which local law enforcement agencies receive intelligence information from their 
fusion centers, 63 percent of sheriffs and almost 60 percent of police chiefs found 
the frequency of written bulletins and products were appropriate, while 
approximately 22 percent of the respondents claimed to not receive any. When 
asked about information received electronically via e-mail or texting almost 61 
percent of sheriffs and 50 percent of chiefs were satisfied with the frequency of 
information being disseminated electronically by their respective fusion centers. 
Roughly 21 percent of sheriffs and 35 percent of police chiefs claimed they were 
not receiving electronic messages on an ongoing basis. This appears to be an 
area in which CSSA and CPCA can potentially assist the fusion centers in 
identifying which of their members want to be added to various fusion center 
product distribution lists. Data captured in the final category of responses 
revealed that telephonic notifications are the least common distribution method of 
the three mentioned. 
 Question: Ideally, how frequently would you like to receive 
intelligence updates on potential threats to your community or 
California? 
In an effort to determine how frequently sheriffs and police chiefs prefer to 
receive intelligence updates from fusion centers regarding possible threats within 
their jurisdictions or the state, the top two responses by both survey groups 
(sheriffs and chiefs) indicated “weekly” products and “incident driven” threat 
specific intelligence with no set timeframe (see Figure 8). Roughly 15 to 17 
percent of respondents wanted information on a daily basis, with almost 10  
 
 
percent preferring to receive it twice a month and 10 percent on a monthly basis. 
The majority of comments offered by respondents under the category of “other” 
appeared consistent with incident or threat specific updates, when appropriate.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Preferred Frequency of Intelligence Dissemination 
Developing a fusion center production plan that identifies the types of 
products offered, their frequency, and methods for dissemination is advocated 
under the Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 18). Implementing a reevaluation process could 
capture the specific methods and frequency most desirable within each fusion 
center’s area of responsibility. 
E. FUTURE SUPPORT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 Question: The current economic crisis has adversely affected law 
enforcement agencies statewide and has highlighted concerns over 
the sustainability of fusion centers. In light of your current budget 
and departmental priorities, how likely are you to support the need 
to sustain fusion centers through the following means? (See 
Appendix A for choices.) 
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Given the current fiscal crisis impacting California, including county and 
city governments, sheriffs and police chiefs were surveyed by the CHP regarding 
how likely they would be to support the sustainability of fusion centers through 
political support, financial support, and personnel resources (staffing).  
While an extraordinarily high number of sheriffs and police chiefs 
expressed a willingness to offer their political support to sustain fusion centers, 
93 percent and 90 percent, respectively, an almost equal percentage indicated 





Figure 9.   Support for Future Sustainability 
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Similarly, a sizable majority, 84 percent and 72 percent, respectively, 
indicated an inability to provide staffing support to fusion centers and a similar 
percentage stated they could not support fusion center operations, if necessary, 
using loaned office space within their own departments. These findings support 
previous independent research outlined in the Literature Review (Chapter II), 
indicating that many jurisdictions would be unable to support fusion centers 
operations without continued federal funding and support (National Governors 
Association Center for Best Practices, 2007, p. 1).   
Of those sheriffs and chiefs who expressed an inability to provide staffing 
in support of fusion center operations, a significant number indicated they would 
consider doing so if their staff could be remotely connected to the fusion center 
from their own agency using some form of “virtual” fusion center environment.  
The development of virtual fusion center methodologies is supported by 
the Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Support and Implementation Project, which recommends agencies explore the 
concept of virtual fusion centers to allow regional agencies to share information 
and enable law enforcement personnel to access information electronically (U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, pp. 19–20). 
Fusion Center Guidelines also highlight the importance of identifying the 
necessary resources and maintaining center sustainability (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, 2006, p. 7), 
and given the financial challenges facing California and the uncertainty of long-
term federal funding support, the STTAC and RTTACs must continue to explore 
alternative funding sources and methods to maintain their sustainability.  
F. ANALYSIS 
The author’s analysis of the raw data collected by the CHP from its survey 
of sheriffs and police chiefs across California provides insight into the intelligence 
requirements of local law enforcement agencies and feedback for the STTAC 
and other fusion centers to consider when attempting to align services and 
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deliverables with the needs of their customers. It is interesting to note that while 
sheriffs and police chiefs were surveyed separately by the CHP, their responses 
were most often similar in nature, suggesting comparable intelligence needs 
among local law enforcement agencies as a whole.  
In this section, the author intends to summarize some of the principal 
analytical findings articulated throughout this chapter and how those findings 
offer useful “takeaways” for the STTAC and RTTACs to consider as part of a 
recurring reevaluation process. 
In carefully examining the CHP’s survey data, the author’s analysis 
revealed that the majority of local law enforcement agencies in California are 
receiving information and intelligence from their local fusion centers on an 
ongoing basis. Local agency interaction with the STTAC is far less frequent than 
with the RTTACs and may be attributable, in large part, to the current construct in 
California in which the RTTACs serve as the primary points of contact for 
agencies within their respective regions or areas of responsibility.  
Generally speaking, the information and intelligence provided by fusion 
centers is considered “somewhat useful” to “useful” by most law enforcement 
agencies receiving it. A large percentage of responses described the information 
as somewhat useful, and suggested additional modifications could be made to 
heighten the value of products and deliverables for fusion center consumers. In 
evaluating what steps or modifications could be taken to increase the value of the 
intelligence and information provided by fusion centers, the author’s analysis 
revealed that local law enforcement leaders were in large part desirous of greater 
information sharing, heightened communication, and an increased level of 
intelligence support for threats impacting their local communities; primarily 
gangs. Additionally, sheriffs and police chiefs stressed the need for timely, 
specific, and actionable intelligence on threats impacting their communities and 
discouraged vague, ambiguous, or dated information already widely reported in 
the mainstream media. 
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California sheriffs and police chiefs disclosed that their primary community 
threats and intelligence needs involved gangs, narcotics, and weapons, in 
descending order, with terrorism placing fourth in their list of intelligence 
priorities. More than half of the sheriffs and police chiefs identified gangs as their 
single highest threat and listed fusion center support in the form of gang related 
intelligence as one of their top three recommendations for increasing the value of 
fusion center services, which strongly suggested it was an area the STTAC and 
RTTACs should evaluate further.  
According to the GAO, several other states’ fusion centers are presently 
supporting gang related intelligence as part of their overall mission (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007, pp. 49, 74, 99, 100) and federal 
guidance on establishing and operating gang task forces and gang intelligence 
units strongly encourages collaboration with fusion centers to promote greater 
information sharing (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
2008, pp. 8-9). This appears to be an area in which customer needs and fusion 
center services can be more closely aligned. This notion of identifying customer 
needs as part of the overall process to define fusion center priorities and 
objectives, in this case, in terms of recognizing the desire for gang related 
intelligence, is consistent with recommendations made in Fusion Center 
Guidelines (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, p. 23) and Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 13).  
When comparing the stated intelligence needs of local law enforcement 
agencies with products and deliverables currently provided by California fusion 
centers, less than half of the police chiefs and slightly more than half of the 
sheriffs indicated their primary intelligence needs are being fulfilled, mostly as it 
relates to counterterrorism. An almost equal percentage collectively stated their 
primary intelligence needs were either not being met or were unsure if their 
needs were being met, which suggested customer expectations versus the 
intelligence products currently received were often inconsistent and that some 
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agencies might need to conduct an updated intelligence assessment to identify 
their intelligence needs and the extent to which intelligence gaps might exist 
more clearly.  
As mentioned previously, of those who indicated their needs were not 
being met, more information sharing, greater communication, and additional 
gang related intelligence were the top three recommendations from local law 
enforcement agencies to help bolster the value of information being provided.  
These findings suggest a two-pronged approach to increasing the value of 
intelligence information: one prong relating to the timeliness, specificity, and 
value of intelligence, and the second prong pertaining to the availability of a 
broader swath of intelligence, such as intelligence related to gangs, as opposed 
to counterterrorism products solely. The use of a formal reevaluation process, as 
advocated by Fusion Center Guidelines (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2006) and Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), may help the STTAC and 
RTTACs further clarify current and future gaps between needs and deliverables 
on an ongoing basis. 
The majority of sheriffs and police chiefs believe an all crimes mission is 
the most appropriate format for the STTAC, with the second largest 
recommendation being an all hazards approach. This finding is consistent with 
similar positions taken by the IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2008, pp. 3, 5), the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association (Major Cities Chiefs 
Association, Homeland Security Committee, 2008, p. 4), and other independent 
studies highlighting the propensity for law enforcement agencies generally to 
support all crimes fusion centers (Rollins, 2008, p. 87). Had the CHP’s survey 
also asked fire chiefs, emergency medical services (EMS) managers, and public 
health officials for their recommendations regarding the appropriate mission for 
the STTAC, The author cannot help but wonder what the results would be in 
comparison to the CHP’s survey of strictly law enforcement leaders. While some 
research exists to suggest that fusion centers with an all hazards mission are 
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generally more attractive to non-law enforcement personnel, such as fire and 
public health (Rollins, 2008, pp. 36, 88), the survey conducted by the CHP lacks 
the data necessary to determine the opinions or recommendations of other 
disciplines regarding the STTAC. Accordingly, it appears prudent that the STTAC 
seek similar feedback from other fusion center customers prior to determining the 
appropriate mission that best meets the needs of the collective community of 
federal, state, and local government and private sector stakeholders, as opposed 
to one segment or discipline alone. Doing so is consistent with the Fusion Center 
Guidelines recommendation that centers collaboratively develop their mission 
statements and identify customer needs (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 5). 
On the topic of delivery methods and frequency, the majority of sheriffs 
and police chiefs appear generally satisfied with the frequency of information 
they receive in the form of written bulletins and electronic distributions by e-mail 
or text. Telephonic notification is the least utilized method among those 
mentioned in the CHP’s survey. The percentage of respondents who reported not 
receiving written bulletins and/or e-mailed products from their fusion center 
appears consistent with the percentage who previously indicated they did not 
receive information from their center on an ongoing basis. Based on the author’s 
analysis and findings, it appears the STTAC can work closely with CSSA and 
CPCA to determine which of their members are presently not receiving fusion 
center products and compile a list of those to be added to each center’s 
respective distribution list. Once compiled, the STTAC can share the lists with the 
appropriate RTTAC servicing the affected jurisdictions to help increase the flow 
of information to their customers. Although this analysis focuses on local law 
enforcement customers exclusively, it highlights the need to canvas other 
professional associations, such as the California State Fire Chiefs Association, to 
help identify other customers seeking similar information and products. This is 
consistent with Baseline Capabilities recommendations that fusion centers  
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develop a dissemination plan to assist in the timely sharing of information with its 
customers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 20). 
On the subject of sustainability, an extraordinarily high percentage of law 
enforcement professionals expressed a willingness to support fusion centers 
politically. Conversely, a similar percentage, 87 percent of chiefs and 93 percent 
of sheriffs, mentioned their inability to support fusion centers financially, and 
more than three-quarters indicated they could not provide staffing to sustain 
fusion center operations. These findings are consistent with other literature 
highlighting concerns regarding the sustainability of fusion centers without 
continued federal funding (National Governors Association Center for Best 
Practices, 2007). Interestingly, the author’s analysis of the CHP’s data revealed a 
potential willingness by some law enforcement leaders to consider providing 
staffing to support fusion centers if their representative could be connected 
remotely through some form of “virtual” fusion center operating platform or 
connection from within their own department. While consistent with recent federal 
guidance calling for the exploration of virtual fusion center capabilities (U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), this 
finding is discussed later in this thesis as an area for possible future research.  
Finally, while political support for California’s fusion centers remains 
extremely high among local law enforcement leaders who view fusion centers as 
providing value, it stands to reason that fusion centers must continue to provide 
value to garner continued support. To do so, fusion centers must continue to 
provide value to their customers and, to provide continued value, should assess 
the needs of their customers on an ongoing basis. Given the fact that law 
enforcement leaders who widely support fusion centers are by their own 
admission unable of providing funding or personnel resources to help sustain 
their operations, it makes sense that leaders who did not see a value in fusion 
centers are even less inclined to do so. While not specifically captured in the 
CHP’s survey, based on their responses to related questions, an inference can 
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be drawn that in today’s fiscal environment, were the perceived value of fusion 
center services to diminish in the minds of law enforcement leaders, those 
leaders would not only be less likely to offer staffing support, but may be more 
likely to redirect any current resources to other priorities within their respective 
agencies. To maintain sustainability, fusion centers must remain relevant, 
offering a valued service to their customers and being responsive to their needs. 
The author’s analysis reveals that similar to the business world, the customers 
ultimately decide the value of the products they receive and not the company 
providing them. The fact that a fusion center believes it is providing a valuable 
service is of little consequence should their clients view their services differently. 
Thankfully, the data analyzed suggests that California fusion centers are 
providing “added value” and highlights areas in which that value can be further 
increased. By implementing a formal and ongoing reevaluation process inclusive 
of its clients, including the RTTACs, the STTAC can solicit meaningful customer 
feedback to help strengthen stakeholder relationships and realign its mission and 
deliverables to provide a higher level of service.  
G. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS TO STTAS 
Looking at the preceding analysis, the CHP’s data highlights the general 
belief by local law enforcement agencies that the RTTACs serve as their primary 
points of contact for fusion center intelligence and information, as opposed to the 
STTAC. The current STTAS suggests a similar understanding by acknowledging 
each RTTAC’s independent jurisdiction within its own designated region or area 
of responsibility. If local law enforcement agencies are one of the primary 
customers of the RTTACs and are looking to them for timely, accurate, and 
actionable intelligence to assist in addressing current threats within their 
communities, as the data suggests, what role, if any, should the STTAC play in 
attempting to support the RTTACs in fulfilling that responsibility?  
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As demonstrated through the author’s analysis and corroborated by 
recommendations contained in Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline 
Capabilities, to be successful in supporting the intelligence needs of local law 
enforcement agencies, the RTTACs must have a clear understanding of their 
customers’ needs and of local threats within their jurisdictions. Since one of the 
stated functions of the STTAC is to provide analytical support to the RTTACs, a 
similar argument can be made that to do so, the STTAC must have an 
understanding of the intelligence needs of the RTTACs and their customers if it 
hopes to provide them with meaningful and timely information of value for their 
region and customer base. 
An argument can be made if the RTTACs are to meet the needs of local 
law enforcement successfully, the STTAC must also be capable of supporting the 
needs of the RTTACs. By understanding the intelligence needs of local law 
enforcement agencies and by identifying potential gaps between needs and 
current deliverables, the RTTACs are in a better position to align their 
deliverables properly to meet the current and future needs of their clients and, 
similarly, the STTAC can better align its own services to support the RTTACs in 
performing that mission. While an ongoing reevaluation process is an important 
part of the RTTACs staying properly aligned with local law enforcement 
agencies, this analysis strongly suggests that a similar reevaluation process is 
necessary for the STTAC to remain in alignment with the RTTACs. Utilizing a 
similar reevaluation process, the STTAC can solicit recurring feedback from the 
RTTACs to help identify their intelligence needs and those of their customers, 
and look for gaps in the services offered by the STTAC in contrast to those 
needs. Doing so helps to ensure the proper alignment and efficiency of the entire 
statewide fusion center system, STTAS.  
V. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA FROM CALIFORNIA’S 
REGIONAL TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT CENTERS  
Fusion centers should take into account the needs and 
requirements of their respective jurisdictions when producing 
products and services” 










(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 61)
Baseline Capabilities highlights the need for every fusion center to have a 
clearly defined mission statement that communicates its role, priorities, and 
purpose (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 24). In defining their mission statement, fusion centers are encouraged 
to establish goals and objectives collaboratively in an effort to create “ownership” 
mong participants and stakeholders (U.S. 
epartment of Homeland Security, U.S. 
epartment of Justice, 2006, p. 23). To 
ollaboratively identify the appropriate 
ission for the State Terrorism Threat 
ssessment Center (STTAC), increase 
ollaboration between the STTAC and 
egional Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Centers (RTTACs), and evaluate methods for enhancing the STTAC’s value to 
California’s State Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS) and the 
RTTACs, the newly appointed STTAC management team conducted a survey of 
the RTTAC commanders as part of a comprehensive reevaluation process (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 21). This 
chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the survey data garnered by the STTAC 










In February 2010, during a STTAS commanders meeting in Sacramento, 
the STTAC distributed surveys to each of the RTTAC commanders in an effort to 
solicit their candid feedback, identify RTTAC support needs, and help shape 
potential modifications to the STTAC’s mission and services. In conducting the 
survey, no discerning information regarding the identity of the RTTAC 
commanders or their respective centers was captured by the STTAC, in an effort 
to avoid attribution. For purposes of this qualitative analysis, the anonymous 
survey data provided by the STTAC is generically categorized as originating from 
RTTAC A, RTTAC B, RTTAC C, or RTTAC D.  
In examining the survey questions distributed by the STTAC, the author 
noted several themes in the categories of information being sought. The first four 
questions, for example, appeared intended to derive insights into the internal 
operations of the RTTACs, the following three questions solicited feedback 
regarding how the STTAC could provide greater value to the RTTACs, and the 
final three questions sought to identify methods to increase collaboration and 
information sharing between the STTAC and RTTACs, as part of California’s 
STTAS. For purposes of this qualitative analysis, the data captured by the 
STTAC is categorized as follows: (1) questions regarding RTTAC processes; (2) 
questions regarding STTAC processes; and (3) questions regarding STTAS 
processes. Appendix B contains a complete record of the survey questions. 
B. QUESTIONS REGARDING RTTAC PROCESSES 
1. What Best Describes the Current Mission of Your Fusion 
Center? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
 RTTAC A. Other; Focused on Terrorism. Many of the recognized 
terrorist groups, whether international or domestic, are all involved 
with criminal behavior to finance and support their respective goals. 
Hence, we are dealing with all crimes related to these groups. 
 RTTAC B. All Crimes. 
 RTTAC C. All Crimes. 
“When creating a mission 
statement and goals, 
consider identifying 
[fusion] center customers 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
 RTTAC D. Currently Counterterrorism only. However, we are in the 
process of integrating the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) into the center for an all crimes approach. 
b. Analysis 
The majority of RTTACs classify themselves as being “all crimes” 
fusion centers or are in the process of adopting an all crimes format. Even the 
one RTTAC that classified its mission as “other” and stated its principal focus 
was on terrorism clarified that it does utilize an “all crimes” approach for offenses 
with a possible nexus to terrorism. The adoption of an all crimes format is 
consistent with recommendations outlined in Baseline Capabilities (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 24) and 
the growing national trend of fusion centers expanding their missions to include 
all crimes and/or all hazards (Rollins, 2008, p. 21). As mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, the standing mission for the STTAC, as documented in Fusion Center 
Guidelines, has been largely directed towards antiterrorism only (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 24). 
Therefore, examining the survey data obtained by the STTAC, it appears that the 
STTAC’s mission statement is potentially misaligned with those of the RTTACs 
and contrary to recommended guidance in 
Baseline Capabilities suggesting that fusion 
centers consider adopting all crimes and/or all 
hazards missions (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 7). In light of the fact that the 
STTAC and RTTACs are intended to work 
collaboratively as part of a unified STTAS 
network (Governor's Office of Homeland 
Security, 2008, p. 13), it appears that a 
revision of the STTAC mission statement is warranted. In addition to providing 
insight into the current mission of each RTTAC, the data captured through this 
question offers the STTAC useful information regarding the types of intelligence 
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support the RTTACs may require from the STTAC, since one of the stated 
purposes of the STTAC is to provide analytical support to the RTTACs 
(Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 15). To be able to support the 
RTTACs in their collective fulfillment of an all crimes mission, it appears that the 
STTAC also must be capable of accessing and disseminating intelligence and 
other information to support that capacity. By obtaining a better understanding of 
the intelligence needs of its customers, the STTAC is in a better position to 
define its mission collaboratively, which is also consistent with recommendations 
outlined in Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, pp. 5, 23; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 24).  
2. Who Do You Consider to Be the Primary Customers of Your 
Fusion Center (RTTAC)? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
 RTTAC A. Law enforcement, with situational awareness provided to 
fire and emergency services. 
 RTTAC B. Primary is first responders/investigators. Close second is 
chief executives. 
 RTTAC C. Public Safety, Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources. 
 RTTAC D. Locals (i.e., police department, sheriff); however, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) utilizes the center for 
Requests for Information (RFIs) and outreach efforts. 
b. Analysis 
The overwhelming majority of RTTACs view their primary 
customers as being local law enforcement agencies, first responders, and/or 
public safety personnel within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Since each 
RTTAC’s jurisdiction and mission is primarily concentrated on activities having a 
nexus or potential impact to their respective AORs, perhaps it should not be 
surprising to find that each RTTAC overwhelmingly identified stakeholders within 
their local jurisdiction as being their primary customers—with the exception of 
RTTAC D, which also listed the FBI. It is interesting to note, that none of the 
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“…Consider identifying 
center customers and 
their needs and defining 
center priorities prior to 
drafting the mission 
statement and goals.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
RTTACs listed the STTAC or state as being a primary customer and only one 
center, RTTAC D, mentioned a federal agency. While the list of primary 
customers provided by each RTTAC is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of 
every principal customer or benefactor of each RTTAC’s services, the fact that 
neither the STTAC, state, nor other federal agencies were readily identified as 
primary customers may be an indication that they are perceived as being 
secondary users of RTTAC services or that the principal focus of each 
respondent when answering this question was directed predominantly within their 
OR. It can also signal a possible perception 
mong the RTTAC commanders that state 
gencies, in general, are a primary customer 
f the STTAC. In either case, the data offers 
he STTAC a firsthand assessment regarding 
ho the RTTACs view as their primary 
ustomers and, in doing so, affords the 
rimary customer base, in consultation with 
the RTTACs. Ultimately, the STTAC needs to know who its customers are, both 
current and prospective, to more effectively define its mission and establish 
reliable methods for delivering services to its clients (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 23; U.S. Department of 








STTAC an opportunity to clarify its own 
p
3. What Method(s), if Any, Does Your Center Currently Use to 
Build Collaboration Among Participants Within Your Center 
and Stakeholders? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
 RTTAC A. Primary outreach is achieved through the development 
of the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program and related training. 
Other members of the first responder community are reached via 
the development of Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWGs),  
 
 
which are designed to bring partners together from the first 
responder community to prepare ways to fill gaps identified by 
intelligence and threat. 
 RTTAC B. Question skipped. No response provided. 
 RTTAC C. Training, liaison officer outreach, exercise development 
and participation, web distribution of material, conference calls. 
“Collaboration is vital to 
the success of fusion 
centers.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 17)
 RTTAC D. Outreach (i.e., TLO working groups) and 
sharing/dissemination of analytical products. 
b. Analysis 
All three answers were primarily focused on external agency and 
customer outreach within their respective AORs, as opposed to internal efforts to 
build or enhance collaboration among 
agencies or staff working within their 
respective centers. This emphasis towards 
external partnerships and outreach may be an 
indication that each RTTAC commander 
perceives the greatest need for collaboration 
or relationship building as being outside the 
walls of their respective centers and may also signal that the RTTAC 
commanders do not presently see significant challenges with collaboration 
among agencies or individuals working within their facilities. The RTTACs’ 
external focus on outreach and dissemination appears to present a viable 
opportunity for the STTAC to work closely with each RTTAC to align their 
respective operations more effectively and enhance collaboration. A similar 
approach must also be exercised by the STTAC, as it attempts to build 
collaborative relationships both internally and externally among various 
homeland security stakeholders, including the RTTACs.  
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4. What Method(s), if Any, Does Your Center Utilize to Determine 
the Intelligence Requirements of Your Customers and to 
Determine Whether Those Needs Are Being Met? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
 RTTAC A. Gaps are identified by using the intelligence cycle. The 
cycle includes domain assessment of threat and constant 
reevaluation using threat stream data overlaid against Suspicious 
Activity Reporting (SAR). This information is then confirmed and 
vetted against identified gaps. Situational awareness is then 
provided via Situational Intelligence Reports (SIRs) and briefings. 
 RTTAC B. Historically, this has not been done effectively. We are in 
the process of developing surveys to help determine 
needs/effectiveness. Additionally, we engage in law enforcement 
briefing outreach. 
 RTTAC C. Working with the FBI field intelligence group (FIG) and 
regional intelligence groups. 
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“It is important to know 
who the program’s 
customers are and what 
types of services and 
products they need.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 57)
 RTTAC D. State/local collection plan. The center has created 
state/local intelligence requirements. 
b. Analysis 
In analyzing the response data, the information offers general 
insights into the overall development of intelligence priorities and recurring 
lanning, but to a large extent, fails to provide 
equirements of their primary customers, as 
pecified in Question B.2. within this section, 
r how they solicit feedback from those 
ustomers to ascertain whether or not their 
telligence needs are being met. RTTAC B is 
reportedly in the process of developing customer surveys to help identify 
customer needs and determine the effectiveness of products and also utilizes 
agency briefings to obtain feedback and assess their performance. Knowing the 
stated intelligence needs of its customers can assist the RTTACs in developing 
p
detailed information regarding how each 







programs and services geared towards fulfilling those identified intelligence and 
information requirements and potentially enhance customer satisfaction. 
Additionally, by understanding the intelligence needs of the RTTACs and their 
subsidiary customers, the STTAC can derive a more informed understanding of 
the products and services necessary to support their needs and, in doing so, 
more effectively tailor its mission and multiagency composition to meet those 
requirements. Fusion Center Guidelines acknowledges that to be successful, 
collaborative fusion center partnerships must continually provide value to their 
customers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, p. 30). That message is steadfastly reinforced by a recent International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) publication entitled Razing Expectation: 
Erecting a Strategic Vision for Fusion Centers, which argues that customer 
needs must be the motivating force for fusion center operations (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, Homeland Security Committee, 2010, p. 6). 
C. QUESTIONS REGARDING STTAC PROCESSES 
1. What Do You Believe the Role of the State Fusion Center 
Should Be Within the STTAS? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
 RTTAC A. One of the major gaps is a statewide situational 
awareness unit (SAU). We do not have the resources or time to 
focus on this issue. A statewide SAU that can monitor and produce 
quick and accurate situational awareness products that apply the 
“what does this mean to me” value added specific to California. We 
also have a major gap on providing a threat picture specific to 
critical infrastructure and providing critical infrastructure/key 
resources (CI/KR) support. 
 RTTAC B. Provide strategic products to the decision makers in 
state government. This can be done by working with the regional 
fusion centers and by compiling products from the regional fusion 
centers into a statewide product for political consumption. Provide 
intelligence briefings to political decision makers (face-to-face) to 
improve awareness of STTAC efforts. Provide analytical support to 
regional fusion centers, when requested. They should not be in the 
business of assessing, researching, analyzing, or writing strategic 
products on any issue that is region specific, without cooperatively 
working with the regional fusion center. Maintain an SAU within the 
STTAC.  
 RTTAC C. Strategic analysis, situational awareness, statewide 
information dissemination  
In developing and 
implementing all fusion 
process-related plans 
and procedures, the 
center shall coordinate 
with other fusion centers 
within its state to identify 
the roles and 
responsibilities of each 
center….” 
 
(Baseline Capabilities, p. 12) 
 RTTAC D. Collection point/intake and to provide relevant 
information to Governor and Secretary of California Emergency 
Management Agency (Cal EMA) for situational awareness. 
b. Analysis 
In conducting a qualitative 
analysis of the data captured from the 
RTTACs in response to this question, 
several common factors were identified. All 
four RTTACs discussed the need for 
situational awareness, with three of the 
four respondents calling for the creation of 
a situational awareness capability or 
statewide SAU within the STTAC. In fact, 
during a recent STTAS commanders 
meeting in February 2010, at least one of 
the RTTAC commanders requested that th
creating a statewide SAU within the state center, as opposed to having a 
separate SAU at Cal EMA (RTTAC and STTAC commanders, personal 
communication, 2010). The desire for the state to produce strategic versus 
tactical products, assist with CI/KR and analytical support, when requested, and 
to brief the governor and other state decision makers on issues of significance 
appear consistent with several of the STTAC-related functions previously 
outlined in Chapter III and contained within the California State Homeland 
Security Strategy and STTAS Strategic Business Plan Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS). As part of the STTAC’s ongoing effort to reevaluate its current  
 
 
e STTAC and Cal EMA consider 
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“Fusion Centers shall 
have a defined mission 
statement that is clear 
and concise and conveys 
the purpose, priority, and 
roles of the center.” 
 
(Baseline Capabilities, p. 24) 








What Services Could the STTAC Perform or Provide That 
Would Benefit Your RTTAC and the STTAS Overall? 
 
state level executives, but also be 
able to provide those same types of briefings in the RTTAC AORs. 
 and by 
                                           
omposition, the STTAC should develop a 
ollaboratively defined mission statement that 
onsiders the needs of the RTTACs, as well 
s other federal, state, and local stakeholders 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
epartment of Justice, 2008, p. 12). 
2. 
a. RTTAC Responses 
RTTAC A. SAU statewide. Topical trained briefers that can provide 
not only situational briefings for 
Produce CI/KR threat stream products related to the 18 nodes of 
CI/KR (domain). Create strategic products such as a statewide 
summation of Guardian1 reports prepared by the RTTACs. 
 RTTAC B. Same response as the previous question. Provide 
strategic products to the decision makers in state government. This 
can be done by working with the regional fusion centers
compiling products from the regional fusion centers into a statewide 
product for political consumption. Provide intelligence briefings to 
political decision makers (face-to-face) to improve awareness of 
STTAC efforts. Provide analytical support to regional fusion 
centers, when requested. They should not be in the business of 
assessing, researching, analyzing, or writing strategic products on 
any issue that is region specific, without cooperatively working with 
the regional fusion center. Maintain an SAU within the STTAC.  
 RTTAC C. Situational awareness, strategic analytical support, 
information dissemination. 
 RTTAC D. Better coordination with the RTTACs. Send out RFIs in 
regards to what the needs are of Cal EMA, etc. 
 
1 Guardian reports refer to output from the FBI’s unclassified e-Guardian system, which is 
designed to assist law enforcement agencies in sharing unclassified information (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2009). 
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Analysis of the survey data suggests a strong desire by the 
RTTACs for e statewide situational awareness, strategic 
analytical pro
3. What Three Improvements or Changes Would You Like to See 
the STTAC Make over the Course of the Year? 
 RTTAC A. Clearly define a mission, create an SAU, and produce 
established.  
otocols, develop standard 
 
b. Analysis 
the STTAC to provid
ducts, and general analytical support. At least two of the RTTACs 
focused on the need for the STTAC to increase its capacity to provide situational 
intelligence briefings to senior officials and, in some instances, to the RTTACs or 
their subsidiaries. These recommendations offer meaningful insights into the 
types of products and services that can help increase the STTAC’s value to the 
RTTACs and may ultimately contribute to defining or clarifying the STTAC’s 
mission; both of which are stated objectives of Baseline Capabilities (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 12–13, 
16 ). The comments from RTTAC B express a desire that the STTAC not be 
directly involved in local constituency issues without working in unison with the 
affected RTTAC. Lastly, survey data from RTTAC D suggests that some may 
view the STTAC as the vertical connection to state government, political entities, 
etc.  
a. RTTAC Responses 
domain reports on CI/KR. 
 RTTAC B. Establish a mission statement in conjunction with the 
RTTACs. Because form follows function, reassess staffing and 
resourcing after mission is 
 RTTAC C. Combining California Highway Patrol (CHP) information 
sharing and Cal EMA information sharing resources; develop 
statewide information dissemination pr
strategic products. 




“It is important to have a 
mission statement 
because it focuses efforts 
and is the foundation of 
all decisions that follow.”
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23) 
b. Analysis 
At least three of the four RTTACs have expressed a need for the 
STTAC to de n Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities 
both call upo
fine its mission. Fusio
“A good mission 
statement will provide 
strategic vision and 
direction for the [fusion] 
center.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
n fusion center commanders to 
define their mission collaboratively and 
identify the roles and responsibilities centers 
within the state as one of core foundational 
requirements (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, 
pp. 5, 23; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, 
pp. 12, 24). Given the STTAC’s involvement in the STTAS and its designation as 
the primary state fusion center for California, it is imperative that the STTAC 
collaboratively develop a clear and concise mission that is clearly understood 
and accepted by the RTTACs and other homeland security stakeholders (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 23; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 24). As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the previously held mission of the STTAC was 
based predominantly on antiterrorism only (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 24) and appears misaligned with 
the largely all crimes missions being 
supported by the RTTACs—as evidenced by 
the responses to Question B.1. in this 
chapter. Since the potential stakeholders 
having a vested interest in defining the 
mission of the STTAC are arguably broader 
than the current agencies participating within 
STTAC and the RTTACs combined, it 
appears prudent that efforts to redefine the STTAC’s mission also take into 
consideration the perspectives of other federal state, and local stakeholders to 
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ld You Recommend Be Utilized to 
Your Fusion Center and the 
 
trust on how information will be used. Show value by 
mation in support of the STTAS. 





help create “buy in” and ensure the mission takes into consideration the 
intelligence and information needs of a state as large and diverse as California. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter IV, California sheriffs and police chiefs have 
also recommended that the STTAC’s mission be expanded to include an all 
crimes approach. That feedback must also be considered in defining the 
STTAC’s mission. Doing so helps define a collaborative and sustainable mission 
more apt to receive widespread support from its intended customers, as opposed 
to creating a mission that is potentially uninformed, misaligned, or fails to provide 
continued value to its customers, participants, and stakeholders (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 30).  
D. QUESTIONS REGARDING STTAS PROCESSES 
1. What Methods Wou
Strengthen Collaboration Between 
STTAC? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
RTTAC A. Defining and understanding the STTAC’s mission. 
Ensuring 
producing viable and useful infor
 RTTAC C. Participation in the STTAS commanders’ group 
meetings and conference calls, exchange of state and regional 
fusion center personnel for familiarization with each other’s
operations.  








“The purpose of 
collaboration is to 
increase capacity, 
communication, and 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 29)
b. Analysis 
The need for enhanced communication and collaboration between 











olicy Council or 
ts to Examine 
Statewide STTAS Related Issues on an Ongoing Basis? Why 
 RTTAC A. Yes, the development of a STTAS advisory group to 
ffs and California Police Chiefs 
Association representatives would help educate and define the 
nd RTTAC command
Chapter I, the STTAC had 
ecently been void of any fulltime law 
nforcement or multiagency participation for 
ore than a year, which weakened its 
cceptance by the other RTTACs and its 
ffectiveness in establishing collaborative 
ocal homeland security stakeholders 
RTTAC commanders and homeland 
ecurity executives, personal communication 
with 2009). With the recent insertion of fulltime CHP and California Department of 
Justice (DOJ) personnel within the STTAC and the transfer of daily management 
responsibilities to the CHP, efforts have been underway to reestablish 
interpersonal relationships, trust, and collaboration between the STTAC and 
other STTAS partners. Building effective interpersonal relationships and trust are 
critical to enabling and maintaining meaningful collaboration between the STTAC 
and RTTACs (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2006, pp. 29–30; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 25).  
2. Would There Be Value in Establishing a P
Advisory Group Among STTAS Participan
or Why Not? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
include California State Sheri
STTAS and STTAC missions. 
 RTTAC B. Policy council no; advisory group yes. A better title might 
be “Advocacy Council.” They s
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Fusion Center Guidelines (Page 
61) 
hould be command level staff from 
speak the same language, 
matters, etc. 
 suggests widespread support among the 
RTTAC commanders for the creation of a STTAS advisory group to help provide 
input and offe
agencies (below the highest ranking chief executive), but important 
enough to wield influence on their department in terms of access to 
seeking executive support, when needed. They could also provide 
ideas, suggestions in terms of future efforts. I do not think they 
should have policy powers, lest the STTAS have 
programs/decisions forced upon us.  
 RTTAC C. Yes, you know it. 
 RTTAC D. Yes, to ensure we 
understanding privacy policy 
b. Analysis 
Analysis of the data
r recommendations on STTAS-
related issues on a recurring basis. In fact, 
during the STTAS commanders meeting, 
held on February 10–12, 2010, the STTAC 
and four RTTAC commanders agreed in 
principle to the idea of developing a STTAS 
advisory or advocacy counsel as a means of 
capturing input and recommendations from a 
diverse group of homeland security stakeholders (STTAC and RTTAC 
commanders, personal communication, 2010). As proposed in that meeting, the 
advisory group would potentially consist of an executive level representative on 
behalf of the STTAC and each of the RTTACs (as appointed by their respective 
governance boards); a sheriff from a urban county and a sheriff from a rural 
county (as appointed by the California State Sheriffs Association); a police chief 
from a urban city and a police chief from a rural city (as appointed by the 
California Police Chiefs Association); and representatives from CHP; California 
DOJ; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); Cal EMA; 
DHS; and the FBI (STTAC and RTTAC commanders, personal communication, 
2010). The creation of such an advisory group appears consistent with the 
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d for Sharing 
Information Among STTAS Participants? If Yes, What System 
 
ld need to be evaluated to ensure 
the correct system is identified and used.  
y best be solved by all 
ave already, though usually through e-
 too many alternatives to list.  
 survey of the 
RTTACs and ons at the STTAS commanders meeting held 
in February 2
recommendation in Fusion Center Guidelines that centers establish an “advisory 
committee” as part of its governance structure that includes participation from 
various disciplines and levels of government (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, 2006, pp. D-3). It also supports 
the recommendation that centers solicit ongoing customer feedback and 
measure performance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2006, pp. 61–62; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 21).  
3. Do You Think There Would Be Value in Having a Common 
Information Sharing Platform or Metho
or Method Do You Recommend? 
a. RTTAC Responses 
RTTAC A. Not sure. There are many technologies and platforms 
both existing and new that wou
 RTTAC B. Good luck with this one. Inherent problems exist 
because of our individual agency information technology 
infrastructures. This is an issue that ma
STTAS components working together to develop and fund web-
based solutions statewide. 
 RTTAC C. Yes 
 RTTAC D. Yes (which we h
mail). There are
b. Analysis 
Based on the data collected from the STTAC’s
 subsequent discussi
010, there appears to be widespread support for the need to identify 
a common information sharing platform or system to facilitate the exchange of 
information and products among STTAS participants more effectively. While e-
mail currently serves as the primary method for sharing products and unclassified 
information between the STTAC and RTTACs, there does not appear to be 
“…If the mission 
statement becomes 
inappropriate, irrelevant, 
or outdated or if the 
center’s direction 
changes, the mission 
statement should be 
revised accordingly.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
consensus among the STTAC and RTTAC 
commanders as to what system or method 
provides the best solution. For now, there 
appears to be agreement among the 
commanders that having a common 
information sharing platform, in addition to e-
mail, is beneficial to the STTAS and a 
willingness to examine possible solutions 
collectively, including the use of a web-based 
platform or unique domain that all STTAC and 
RTTAC products can be posted to, instead of being e-mailed multiple times 
(STTAC and RTTAC commanders, personal communication, 2010). 
E. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Through qualitative analysis of the survey data collected by the STTAC 
rs, a clearer understanding of the current 
missio
ears to Be out of Alignment 
sions of the RTTACs 
The survey data suggests the RTTACs have each essentially adopted an 
all crimes mission, while the historical mission of the STTAC has been directed 
from all four RTTAC commande
ns, services, and primary customers of the RTTACs can be realized. 
Additionally, this data provides the STTAC with useful information in assessing 
the current intelligence and customer service requirements of the RTTACs in 
performing their respective missions and offers a better understanding of the 
types of services and capabilities the RTTACs would like to see from the STTAC. 
Ultimately, this feedback provides useful customer-based information that can be 
utilized as part of a broader effort to solicit feedback from federal, state, and local 
stakeholders and to define the mission of the STTAC more clearly. In analyzing 
the data points collected through the STTAC’s survey, the following principal 
findings or “takeaways” are noted: 
1. The Current STTAC Mission App




U.S. Departm AC and RTTACs are 
intende
a suggests that the RTTACs view local law enforcement 
and ot u
primary custo
agencies and n large part a primary customer of 
the ST
ively wards antiterrorism alone (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
ent of Justice, 2006, p. 24). Since the STT
d to work together as part of unified approach within California’s STTAS, 
and the STTAC is intended to provide analytical support to the RTTACs, when 
requested, having a collaboratively established mission for the STTAC that 
addresses the current threat environment and customer requirements is 
warranted (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, pp. 5, 23; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2008, p. 12). 
2. The STTAC Must Work with the RTTACs and Other 
Stakeholders to Clearly Identify Its Primary Customers and to 
Conduct Recurring Outreach  
The survey dat
her p blic safety organizations within their respective AORs as being their 
mers. It is unclear from the data whether the RTTACs view state 
 other federal entities as being i
TAC or as a secondary user of their own operations. Accordingly, the 
STTAC should clearly identify its principal customers in concert with the RTTACs 
to avoid duplication of effort, potential confusion among prospective customers 
as to which center they should coordinate with, and reduce the likelihood of some 
segment of federal, state, local, or private sector stakeholders being inadvertently 
left out of the process. Identifying the primary customers of the STTAC and 
RTTACs is an integral part of defining each center’s roles and responsibilities 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 23; 







continually provide value 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 30)
Developing the [fusion] 
center mission statement 
and goals collaboratively 
with participating 
entities…will create 
ownership and assist in 
identifying the primary 
role(s) of the 
organization.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
. The STTAC Must Assess the Intelligence and Information 
Needs of Its Primary Customers on an Ongoing Basis 
While the STTAC’s survey represents a good faith effort to obtain candid 
and c ruc
partners—the r federal, 
state, 
r
necessary to meet the present and future 
n
c





 Current Threat 




mission app nd improperly 
aligned
onst tive feedback from one of its primary customers and STTAS 
 RTTACs—feedback should also be obtained from othe
and local homeland security stakeholders in an effort to develop a broad 
ange of intelligence products and services 
eeds of current and prospective STTAC 
ustomers. To be successful, collaborative 
TTAC and RTTACs, must understand the 
eeds of their customers (U.S. Department of 
omeland Security, U.S. Department of 
ustice, 2006, p. 30).  
4. The STTAC Must Clearly Identify Its Mission Utilizing a 
Collaborative Process and Develop a Clear and Concise 
Mission Statement Commensurate with the
The reviewed survey data strongly 
at the RTTACs are unclear 
 precise mission of the STTAC 
d previously, the STTAC’s historic 
ears outdated a
 with the current all crimes missions 
currently being performed or implemented by 
each RTTAC. Considering an all crimes and/or 
all hazards format is also consistent with 
recommendations outlined in Baseline 
Capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 7) and may assist the STTAC in 
providing enhanced support to the RTTACs. Further, Fusion Center Guidelines 
recommends that each center develop its mission statement and goals 
collaboratively to help create “ownership” and “buy-in” from participants and 
stakeholders (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2006, p. 23). Prior to adopting a new mission statement, the STTAC 
should consider the recommendations of the RTTACs and other federal, state, 
and local stakeholders to help develop and implement a collaboratively 
constructed mission capable of fulfilling the needs of all its potential customers.  
5. The STTAC Must Develop Services, Products, and Capabilities 
That Offer Added Value to the RTTACs and Other Consumers 
of Its Se
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“Fusion centers should 
take into account the 
needs and requirements 
of their respective 
jurisdictions when 
producing products and 
services.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 57)
rvices 
needs experi










The survey data identifies gaps in the current intelligence and service 
enced by the RTTACs and documents the essential services and 
AC. This data suggest a need for the 
TTAC to reevaluate its services, products, 
nd capabilities to help support the 
ntelligence and information needs of its 
ustomers (U.S. Department of Homeland 
ecurity, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, 
. 57; U.S. Department of Homeland 
ecurity, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, 
p. 12–13). To remain relevant, the STTAC 
must provide added value to its customers, stakeholders, and participants (U.S. 




“Fusion centers embody 
the core of 
collaboration.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 12)
. The STTAC Must Work to Increase Collaboration Internally and 
Externally Among the RTTACs and Other Homeland Security 
The su
with its RTTAC partners and other stakeholders, as it simultaneously attempts to 
rebuild
visory Group 
Comprised of a Broad Range of Disciplines to Help Provide 
Analys
the RTTACs to establish a diverse STTAS advisory group to help provide input 
and offer recommendations on STTAS-relat
Stakeholders 
rvey data support the need for the STTAC to increase collaboration 
 collaboration internally within the STTAC to obtain greater multiagency 
and multidisciplinary participation. The 
respondents have recommended 
increased participation by the STTAC in 
commanders’ meetings, conference calls, 
and e-mails as possible methods to 
enhance the level of collaboration between 
the STTAC and RTTACs, in addition to 
personnel exchanges. Given the STTAC’s current need to foster greater 
collaboration both internally and externally and to develop a collaborative mission 
statement, the STTAC’s ability to identify viable methods for increasing 
collaboration appears vital to its success. Accordingly, the subject of 
collaboration and its importance to multiagency and dispersed organizations, 
such as the STTAS, is discussed in greater detail in Chapter VIII. 
7. The STTAS Should Develop a Standing Ad
Input Regarding the Overall Statewide System  
is of the STTAC’s survey data indicates widespread support among 
ed issues and services on a recurring 
basis. Doing so can help provide valuable input from federal, state, and local 
stakeholders to help ensure that the STTAS is properly aligned and capable of 
supporting the current and future needs of the state. As discussed previously in 
Chapter III, the STTAS is described as a voluntary alliance “wholly dependent 
on” the cooperation and collaboration demonstrated by its participants (Unknown, 
2008). By forming a standing advisory committee that consists of federal, state, 
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AC Commanders Should Explore Methods 
 of Unclassified Information and Products 
widespread s  
or sys
and local representation, in addition to representatives for each of the 
participating STTAS centers, the STTAS can draw upon the needs and 
recommendations of a diverse group of stakeholders to ensure the STTAS 
remains relevant and sustainable. 
8. The STTAC and RTT
to Enhance Sharing
Through the author’s analysis of the survey data, there appears to be 
upport regarding the need to identify a common operating platform
tem to assist the STTAC and RTTACs in exchanging information and 
unclassified intelligence products. While a consensus among the RTTAC 
commanders as to what system(s) may offer a viable solution does not currently 
exist, the involved parties are willing to explore possible alternatives 
collaboratively; including the possible use of a web-based platform or unique 
internet domain through which all STTAC and RTTAC products can be uploaded, 
posted, and accessed. 
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VI. SCANNING OTHER STATES WITH MULTIPLE FUSION 
CENTERS  
If there is more than one fusion center operating within the 
state, the centers should jointly determine how to 
communicate the value, roles, and responsibilities of each of 
the centers…. 
(Baseline Capabilities, p. 26) 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned previously in Chapters I and II, a growing number of states 
across the nation have multiple fusion centers (Rollins, 2008, p. 20). In addition 
to California, nine states have two or more fusion centers, as recognized by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Fusion Center 
Coordination Group (NFCCG) (National Fusion Center Coordination Group, 
2009). These states include Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin (National Fusion Center Coordination 
Group, 2009). 
In attempting to determine the appropriate role for the State Terrorism 
Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) within California’s State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment System (STTAS), Chapters IV and V examined the needs and 
perspectives of sheriffs and police chiefs throughout California, as well as 
California’s Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs). This 
chapter briefly scans other states with multiple fusion centers to explore the roles 
and responsibilities of other designated state fusion centers and what strategies, 
if any, they use to help strengthen collaboration with their regional and/or local 
counterparts. In conducting this “scan,” the author examined available literature 
on state fusion centers and integrated his own personal observations and 
discussions with other state fusion center directors, while serving as the 
designated state representative for the STTAC during the recent 2010 National 
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Fusion Center Conference in New Orleans, Louisiana on February 22–25, 2010. 
By examining other state centers, the author hopes to identify possible 
“takeaways” or “best practices” from other state fusion centers that can prove 
useful to the STTAC. 
B. THE ROLE OF STATE FUSION CENTERS IN OTHER STATES 
One of the first planning recommendations mentioned in Baseline 
Capabilities is the need for fusion centers to establish intrastate coordination 
requirements and procedures among state and local fusion centers and to help 
identify each center’s role and responsibilities as part of a statewide effort (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 12). 
While Baseline Capabilities and Fusion Center Guidelines offer general guidance 
and recommendations on a host of procedural and administrative functions that 
each fusion center should consider and strive to attain, the precise mechanics of 
how multiple centers in a given state ultimately works with one another and their 
various roles and responsibilities are ultimately left for those states and local 
jurisdictions to decide. Not surprisingly, therefore, the roles of designated state 
fusion centers vary from state-to-state. Some perform more of a “strategic” 
function, while others are more “tactical” or “operational” in nature. For example, 
in states like Massachusetts and Illinois, where one or two additional fusion 
centers exist within major urban cities, such as Boston or Chicago, the state 
fusion center often fulfills a greater operational role for the remainder of the state 
by serving as the primary fusion center for communities lacking their own local 
center (State fusion center commanders, personal communication, 2010). In 
Nevada, in addition to being designated as the state fusion center, the Southern 
Nevada Counterterrorism Center, as its name suggests, also serves as the 
primary regional fusion center for the southern portion of the state (State fusion 
center commanders, personal communication, 2010). Each of the 
aforementioned models differs from California’s current STTAS paradigm, in that 
California is fundamentally divided into regions independently serviced by one of 
four RTTACs. As currently designed, the STTAC essentially serves as a 
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statewide overlay for California and is intended to perform a more strategic 
versus tactical function (Unknown, 2008, pp. 2–3). For this reason, the author’s 
analysis of other state models focuses primarily on states having several regional 
and/or local fusion centers—similar to California—and whose state centers may 
also perform a similar strategic function. Given those specified parameters, the 
author chose to examine Florida and Ohio. His exclusion of other states, having 
only one or two additional centers or whose state centers perform a significant 
operational or tactical function, is not intended to be criticism of those 
jurisdictions or their effectiveness in performing their assigned tasks or missions, 
but merely an acknowledgment that their model may be incompatible for use in 
California under its current construct.  
1. Florida 
The Florida Fusion Center (FFC) serves as Florida’s primary state fusion 
center (National Fusion Center Coordination Group, 2009) and is managed by 
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007, p. 64). The FFC’s designation as the state fusion 
center is the result of a letter sent by Florida’s governor to DHS in 2008 (State 
fusion center official, personal communication, 2010). The FFC operates 24 
hours a day, seven days a week and has adopted an all crimes and all hazards 
mission (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007; Florida Fusion Center, 
2008). In addition to the FFC, two regional fusion centers are located in Miami 
and Orlando that are currently recognized by DHS and NFCCG (National Fusion 
Center Coordination Group) (National Fusion Center Coordination Group, 2009). 
A third regional center is now situated in Jacksonville and four more regional 
centers are being developed in Fort Myers, Pensacola, Tallahassee, and Tampa 
Bay—each expected to be fully operational in late 2010 (State fusion center 
official, personal communication, 2010). Once completed, Florida’s seven 
multidisciplinary Domestic Security Task Force (DSTF) regions will each have 
their own corresponding regional fusion center (State fusion center official, 
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personal communication, 2010). The FFC and each of Florida’s regional fusion 
centers, both current and prospective, are independently managed and operated.  
While the FFC and Florida’s regional centers are designed to be all crimes 
and all hazards fusion centers, the FFC performs more of a “strategic” role, while 
the regional centers are principally “tactical” in nature (State fusion center official 
personal communication, 2010). Among its list of primary responsibilities, the 
FFC prepares strategic assessments with regional input from the other centers 
and disseminates strategic products statewide, as well as situational awareness, 
alerts, warnings, and notices (Florida Fusion Center, 2008). Additionally, the FFC 
serves as the primary communication conduit with federal entities, such as the 
National Operations Center (NOC), distributes daily threat briefings, provides 
legislative briefings, and has overarching responsibilities regarding critical 
infrastructure and the management of statewide intelligence data and associated 
technologies (State fusion center official, personal communication, 2010). Some 
of the FFC’s primary customers include Florida’s regional fusion centers, other 
state agencies, professional statewide law enforcement and fire associations, 
and federal departments, while the regional fusion centers are largely 
responsible for servicing their own local and regional customer base, in addition 
to sharing information with the FFC (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 
2008). 
While the FDLE has primary statewide authority for domestic security 
matters, the FDLE works collaboratively and in partnership with each of Florida’s 
regional fusion centers to enhance statewide information sharing (Florida Statute 
943.03101, 2002). The FFC and each of Florida’s regional centers have their 
own respective governance boards; however, no single governance structure or 
board oversees the entire statewide system (State fusion center official, personal 
communication, 2010). Instead, a fusion center leadership team comprised of the 
directors from each center meets on a regular basis to discuss operational issues 
or concerns (State fusion center official, personal communication, 2010), similar 
to California’s STTAS commanders’ workgroup. To help strengthen collaboration, 
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working relationships, and information sharing with regional fusion centers in 
Florida, the FFC provides briefings on an ongoing basis and routinely hosts 
meetings throughout each of Florida’s regions to solicit input proactively and 
maintain two-way communication (State fusion center official, personal 
communication, 2010). Additionally, Florida’s fusion center leadership team has 
begun drafting a communication plan or concept of operations (CONOPS) 
document, which is intended to outline the various roles, responsibilities, and 
statewide processes for each center as part of a statewide system (State fusion 
center official, personal communication, 2010).  
2. Ohio 
Ohio’s Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) serves as Ohio’s 
primary designated state fusion center (National Fusion Center Coordination 
Group, 2009) and is operated by Ohio Homeland Security—a division within the 
Ohio Department of Public Safety (Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information 
Center, 2009). The Ohio State Highway Patrol, as a sister agency, provides the 
operational leadership within the SAIC. The SAIC’s primary mission is focused 
on counterterrorism, using an all crimes approach (State fusion center official, 
personal communication, 2010). Similar to Florida’s FFC, the SAIC’s designation 
as Ohio’s primary state fusion center was established by means of a letter sent 
from the governor to DHS in 2008 (State homeland security official, personal 
communication 2010). Unlike the FFC, the SAIC’s core business hours are from 
7:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., with callout procedures in place, as needed (State homeland 
security official, personal communication, 2010). In addition to the SAIC, two 
DHS and NFCCG recognized regional fusion centers are in Cleveland and 
Cincinnati (National Fusion Center Coordination Group, 2009) and a third 
regional fusion center is located in Columbus (State fusion center official 
personal communication, 2010). The SAIC and Ohio’s regional fusion centers are 
each independently managed and operated. Some, but not all, of the centers 
have their own governance boards (State fusion center official, personal 
communication, 2010).  
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Besides performing its strategic mission, the SAIC provides operational 
support to some of the most rural communities in Ohio considered outside the 
primary service area of an adjacent regional center (State fusion center official, 
personal communication, 2010). The SAIC’s principal statewide strategic 
functions include preparing and disseminating statewide assessments, providing 
statewide situational awareness, distributing officer safety information and 
unclassified statewide products, conducting monthly classified briefings, 
maintaining management oversight of the state’s terrorism liaison officer program 
(TLO), providing analytical support upon request, and administering the state’s 
information sharing system (State fusion center official, personal communication, 
2010). The SAIC also assists Ohio Homeland Security with critical infrastructure 
and key resource (CI/KR) assessments for state properties by providing 
analytical research and support (State fusion center official, personal 
communication, 2010).  
While the SAIC has its own standing state executive board that includes 
state and local public safety representatives, no formal governance board or 
written CONOPS agreement between the SAIC and its regional fusion center 
partners currently exists (State fusion center official, personal communication, 
2010). The various roles and responsibilities for each center have instead been 
informally established and agreed upon collectively by the SAIC and regional 
centers commanders through existing interpersonal relationships and using a 
collaborative approach (State fusion center official, personal communication, 
2010). To help increase collaboration and strengthen the working relationships 
between each center, the SAIC hosts monthly classified briefings, provides 
training, conducts conference calls, and periodically assigns regional 
coordinators from the SAIC to work in the various regional centers on a part-time 
basis (State fusion center official, personal communication, 2010). The SAIC also 
employees a full-time strategic planner who assists in the development of the 
Ohio Homeland Security Plan, which is integral in helping to set the SAIC’s 
strategic vision for the future (State fusion center official, personal 
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communication, 2010). In late 2009, the SAIC was recognized by DHS and the 
NFCCG for its excellence in promoting a Statewide Information Sharing 
Environment (Ohio Homeland Security, 2009).  
C. ANALYSIS 
In examining other states with multiple fusion centers, the author found 
that no “one size fits all” model existed for state fusion centers, in terms of their 
individual roles and responsibilities. While Baseline Capabilities and Fusion 
Center Guidelines offer a general blueprint for states and fusion centers to follow, 
ultimately, each state and its respective local jurisdictions as the general 
contractors must build the necessary framework and decide how each of the 
pieces fits together. For that reason, the precise role, mission, customers, and 
services that each state fusion center supports are often quite different 
depending on the number of additional fusion centers a state may have, how 
regions or areas of responsibility are defined, and how the involved 
jurisdictions—state, regional, and/or local—elect to construct their statewide 
system.  
Although many similarities were noted between Florida and Ohio and 
California’s STTAS, numerous differences were also found. In an effort to 
present the analysis of the FFC and SAIC in a clear, structured, and perhaps 
easily digestible form, the following general categories or headings are used: (1) 
mission, role, and services; (2) governance; (3) collaboration; and (4) information 
sharing.  
1. Mission, Role, and Primary Services 
a. Mission 
The primary mission of the FFC, SAIC, and STTAC are each 
different (State fusion center officials, personal communication, 2010). The FFC 
is an all crimes and all hazards fusion center; the SAIC is primarily focused on 
terrorism using an all crimes approach; and the STTAC has historically 
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performed an antiterrorism mission (State fusion center officials, personal 
communication, 2010). As mentioned previously in Chapter II, Baseline 
Capabilities recommends that fusion centers consider adopting an all crimes 
and/or all hazards fusion center (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 7, 24), as implemented by Florida and Ohio. 
California should, therefore, reassess the mission of the STTAC with input from a 
wide range of stakeholders (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, pp. 5, 23). In looking at each center’s core hours of 
operation, the FFC operates on a 24/7 basis, the SAIC has adopted an 8 to 5 
format with a process in place for after hours callouts, and the STTAC currently is 
staffed from 8 to 5 with no callout process specified. While the hours of service 
for each center are unique, this seems to be an area in which the 
appropriateness of a fusion center’s core business hours should be reevaluated 
on an ongoing basis to determine whether or not the current hours of operation 
are adequately servicing the needs of its customers. Establishing hours of 
operation based upon customer needs and input, an assessment as to the 
number incidents or requests occurring after hours, and the availability of current 
staffing appears to be a balanced and reasonable method for determining the 
appropriate core business hours for the STTAC, in its effort to provide meaningful 
support to the RTTACs and other stakeholders. 
b. Role 
As stated earlier in this chapter, part of the author’s selection 
criteria for analyzing Florida and Ohio was based, in part, on the strategic role 
that both centers appeared to perform within their respective states. That 
principal role was confirmed in large part through his closer examination of both 
states. However, he discovered that Ohio’s SAIC also performed a more 
operational role in servicing the needs of the more rural communities within Ohio 




officials, personal communication, 2010). Examples of specific strategic outputs 
from the FFC and SAIC are discussed in greater detail under the subheading of 
Primary Services.  
California’s current STTAS CONOPS and survey data from the 
RTTACs, discussed in Chapter V, both suggest a desire for the STTAC to 
perform a strategic function within California’s statewide system, similar to the 
FFC. One interesting point regarding the roles of the FFC and SAIC that appears 
largely unwritten and/or unspoken, but discernible through its actions, is that 
each center plays a role as a facilitator or organizer in attempting to pull together 
state and regional efforts. They do so through such actions as hosting monthly 
briefings in Ohio, conducting statewide meetings within every region of Florida, 
and working to develop a statewide communication plan and CONOPs among 
Florida’s centers, to name just a few. 
One additional observation worthy of highlighting is the fact that the 
FFC, SAIC, and STTAC were all designated as the primary state fusion centers 
for their respective states by means of a letter sent by each governor to DHS 
(State fusion center officials, personal communications, 2010). As pointed out in 
Chapter II, those letters were sent to DHS in response to a request by DHS and 
the United States Attorney General calling upon each governor to designate one 
center to serve as a primary point of contact with the federal government on 
issues of homeland security (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
the Inspector General, 2008, p. 45).  
The informal manner in which each fusion center was designated 
as the primary state center gives rise to the observation that if a letter is all that is 
required to establish the designation, a letter is likely all that is required to 
deselect a center, should the present or future administration elect to do so. 
While some might argue that because a state law enforcement agency under the 
purview of the governor manages the FFC, SAIC, and STTAC, current and future 
governors are less inclined to select another center to fulfill that role, nothing 
prohibits them from doing so. In fact, most fusion centers nationwide are not 
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empowered by legislation or governor’s executive order (Rollins, 2008, p. 20). 
While not the principal focus of this research, this informal and ostensibly non-
binding method for designating a state center also calls into question whether 
some local jurisdictions may ultimately question the legitimacy of such a 
designation and view its role as being nothing more than a counterpart or even a 
competitor.  
c. Primary Services 
In assessing the primary strategic services provided by the FFC 
and SAIC, both provide daily threat briefs and/or statewide situational 
awareness, often with regional input (State fusion center officials, personal 
communication, 2010). ). As highlighted in Chapter V, providing statewide 
situational awareness is a capability or service the RTTACs have recently 
requested from the STTAC and appears consistent with services currently 
provided by the FFC and SAIC. In addition to the aforementioned services, the 
FFC and SAIC prepare and disseminate strategic assessments, are involved in 
the states’ CI/KR efforts, brief state and/or legislative officials, and provide 
analytical support to regional centers, as requested (State fusion center officials, 
personal communication, 2010). The SAIC also oversees Ohio’s terrorism liaison 
program (TLO) on a statewide basis, which is a different approach than currently 
utilized in California.  
Under California’s system, each of the RTTAC’s manages its own 
regional TLO program using a standardized and state-certified training curriculum 
(DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services, 2010). 
Since the RTTACs serve as the principal points of contact for local agencies and 
the regional TLOs within the areas of responsibility (AORs), managing the TLO 
program locally allows each of the trained TLOs to establish a two-way 
relationship with their respective RTTAC for their region (State fusion center 
officials, personal communication, 2010). The use of a standardized training 
curriculum statewide and the creation of a TLO managers working group among 
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the STTAS participants helps to maintain statewide consistency across the 
regional TLO training programs (DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance 
Program and Services, 2010). The one area that appears to be in need of 
clarification is what role, if any, the STTAC should play in California’s TLO 
program and whether or not trained TLOs from state agencies should work 
primarily with the RTTAC that “covers” their respective work location, the STTAC, 
since it is the “state center,” or both. This area might best be clarified using a 
collaborative process among the STTAS commanders and TLO managers 
working groups.  
Finally, the SAIC’s use of a certified strategic planner within their 
center to assist in the development of the state strategic plan, as well as the 
establishment of strategic goals and objectives for the SAIC, appears to be a 
worthwhile and somewhat innovative approach in that it lends credence to the 
center’s strategic role and function both internally and externally. 
2. Governance 
In comparing Florida’s and Ohio’s fusion center model to the current 
construct in California, it is important to note that all of the state and regional 
centers are independently managed and operated. Some of the centers have 
their own independent governance processes in place to help provide input 
and/or guide center activities and others do not (State fusion center officials, 
personal communication, 2010). Although some of Ohio’s fusion centers and all 
of Florida’s and California’s fusion centers have separate governance structures 
among state and regional centers as “individual parts” of a conceptualized 
statewide system, none of the three states—Ohio, Florida, or California—
presently have a formal governance body or policy group to help ensure that 
collective statewide efforts among all centers are properly aligned and/or fully 
synchronized (State fusion center officials, personal communication, 2010). 
Similar to California, Florida has instead established a commanders group 
among state and regional fusion center commanders to meet and discuss issues 
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on an ongoing basis and hopefully come to agreement on matters of integration 
and performance (State fusion center officials, personal communication, 2010). 
Additionally, Florida is currently in the process of developing a communication 
plan and written CONOPS to help formally define those agreements in writing 
(State fusion center official, personal communication, 2010). While Ohio’s SAIC 
holds monthly briefings among fusion center commanders, agreements among 
the state and regional centers are in large part accomplished through 
interpersonal relationships, collaboration, and verbal agreements among 
participants (State fusion center official, personal communication, 2010).  
3. Collaboration 
In an effort to foster greater collaboration among state and regional fusion 
centers, both the FFC and SAIC employ a number of methods intended to 
increase contact and participation between each center (State fusion center 
officials, personal communication, 2010). Some of those methods include hosting 
meetings among center commanders, conducting briefings, utilizing conference 
calls, and assigning personnel or analysts to various regional fusion centers on a 
fulltime or interim basis (State fusion center officials, personal communication, 
2010). Even though the assignment of CHP personnel within each of the 
RTTACs predates the CHP’s recent assignment to manage the STTAC, the 
presence of CHP personnel within California’s state and regional centers offers a 
similar connection among each of California’s STTAS centers. Ohio also includes 
the assignment of regional representatives within the SAIC (State fusion center 
officials, personal communication, 2010), but similar regional assignments to the 
STTAC may be logistically difficult and/or cost prohibitive due to the size of 
California, when compared to Ohio.  
As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the FFC’s and SAIC’s designation as 
the state fusion center, much like the STTAC’s, was established through a letter 
by each governor and not through some formal legislative process or executive 
order (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 
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2008, p. 45). The FFC is perhaps closest to being formally recognized in that the 
FDLE statutorily serves as the principal state investigative authority for domestic 
security issues in Florida (Florida Statute 943.03101, 2002). However, given the 
largely informal nature by which most state fusion centers are designated, the 
designation itself in large part appears to be more of a “nominal” title, as opposed 
to bestowing any formal authority upon state fusion centers in their working 
relationship with regional and local centers. What is clear from the author’s 
research in this chapter is that the relationships between state, regional, and 
local fusion centers, including their respective roles, responsibilities, and 
services, are largely established and maintained through voluntary collaboration 
and not by any single fusion center’s designation as the primary state center. 
While the FFC and SAIC each perform tasks that can earn them the title of 
“facilitators,” such as hosting meetings and briefings among participants, the true 
authority or power appears to lie within the will of the collective group. For that 
reason, the importance of collaboration is discussed in much greater detail in 
Chapter VIII.  
4. Information Sharing 
Unlike the STTAC, the FFC and SAIC both oversee their respective state 
information sharing systems and statewide data repositories (State fusion center 
officials, personal communication, 2010). While California’s Department of 
Justice (DOJ) manages California’s Joint Regional Information Exchange System 
(CAL JRIES) and host of other statewide criminal justice systems, a widely 
accepted and common information sharing platform between the STTAC and 
RTTACs has not yet been identified or agreed upon (State and local homeland 
security officials, personal communication, 2010) . As mentioned in Chapter V, 
during a recent meeting among the STTAS commanders and subsequent survey 
by the CHP, the STTAC and RTTAC commanders agreed in principle to the 
notion of identifying a common operating system or information sharing platform 
through which unclassified products and information can be shared (State and 
local homeland security officials, personal communication, 2010). The current 
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models utilized by the FFC and SAIC, coupled with California DOJ’s present role 
in managing Cal JRIES and other criminal justice systems, suggest that a 
statewide information management system might be one option. Other options 
include a joint decision among the STTAC and four RTTACs to utilize a current 
or prospective federal or private sector solution. 
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VII. “EURO FUSION”: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
GERMANY 
While federal publications, such as the Fusion Center Guidelines and 
Baseline Capabilities, offer meaningful recommendations for states and local 
jurisdictions to consider when establishing fusion centers or evaluating the 
capabilities of existing centers, they fail to include lessons that can be learned 
from other countries having joint intelligence or fusion centers. Examining 
intelligence centers in other countries offers alternative methods to consider 
when evaluating the role and mission of the STTAC and, in doing so, provides 
examples of how California might integrate the experiences and/or best practices 
of the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany into a more efficient, collaborative, and 
synchronized statewide system. The UK and Germany were both selected for 
comparative analysis because of their similar democratic principles, close 
relationship as U.S. allies, and history in addressing analogous acts of terrorism; 
including the London Underground bombing in 2005 and the 1972 Summer 
Olympics in Munich. 
A. UNITED KINGDOM: FUSION “ACROSS THE POND” 
It is important that those engaged in terrorism realize that our 
determination to defend our values and our way of life is 
greater than their determination to cause death and 
destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose 
extremism on the world. 
Tony Blair, Prime Minister 
In response to attack on London Underground, July 7, 2005 
 
Not unlike the U.S., stopping terrorist attacks is a top priority of the UK, 
and the collection and analysis of intelligence are important factors in the UK’s 
efforts to detect and prevent terrorist acts (Home Office, 2009, p. 13). In the wake 
of perceived intelligence deficiencies surrounding the Bali Bombings in 2002, the 
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UK established the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in June 2003 
(Intelligence and Security Committee, 2003). The genesis for establishing the 
JTAC bears remarkable similarities to the birth of fusion centers here in the U.S. 
immediately following 9/11, as both countries appeared committed to addressing 
perceived intelligence deficiencies associated with significant acts of terrorism.  
The JTAC serves as the UK’s operations center responsible for the 
analysis and assessment of international terrorism-related intelligence (Security 
Service MI5, 2009). As the word “Joint” in its title suggests, the JTAC is a multi-
agency operation, consisting of representatives from 16 different governmental 
agencies (Security Service MI5, 2009). Prior to the JTAC’s creation in 2003, the 
responsibility for analyzing classified and open source intelligence information 
and preparing threat assessment reports fell upon the Counter-Terrorist Analysis 
Centre (CTAC) (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2002), which was 
developed by the Security Service immediately following 9/11 (Cabinet Office, 
2003, p. 5). Due to the growing number of intelligence leads received by the 
CTAC, and in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the UK’s overall 
counterterrorism abilities, the JTAC was created to replace it (Cabinet Office, 
2003, pp. 3, 5). Under its present command structure, the JTAC reports directly 
to the UK Security Service’s Director General (Security Service MI5, 2009).  
In addition to having a formal command structure under the leadership of 
the Director General of the Security Services, the JTAC also has an established 
governance system managed by the Cabinet Office (Security Service MI5, 2009). 
The Cabinet Office is tasked with overseeing the JTAC governance board, which 
evaluates the center’s effectiveness and helps ensure the needs of its customers 
are fulfilled (Security Service MI5, 2009).  
On the subject of collaboration and information sharing, the JTAC is 
credited with assisting the UK in building more effective working relationships 
between intelligence, law enforcement and security organizations (Home Office, 
2009, p. 64). The positive alliances and teamwork developed among agencies 
working in the JTAC have extended beyond the facility itself, as the JTAC has 
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also created an effective partnership with approximately 400 law enforcement 
officers assigned to the West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit—a segment of 
the Police Counter-Terrorism Network (Home Office, 2009, p. 136). In fact, a 
former ranking officer with the Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command 
has argued that the collaborative working relationships established between 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies are perhaps the most important 
change to have occurred in improving counterterrorism efforts in the UK (Home 
Office, 2009, p. 64).  
In terms of funding and sustainability, evidence exists to suggest that 
investments in counterterrorism capabilities, including those intended to increase 
their resiliency, are a top priority in the UK (HM Government, 2006, p. 27). In fact, 
funding for counterterrorism efforts, including intelligence and resiliency, has 
doubled since 9/11 (HM Government, 2006, p. 27). While the JTAC’s workload 
has reportedly increased by 60 percent since being established in 2003, its 
staffing has also grown by more than 70 percent over the same time period 
(Home Office, 2009, p. 64). Not surprisingly, a commensurate increase in federal 
funding to help support homeland security efforts in the U.S. has also occurred 
since 9/11, including funding to support state and local fusion centers. Since 
9/11, DHS estimates it has spent more than $300 million dollars to support state 
and local fusion centers in the United States (Rollins, 2008, p. 44).  
B. GERMANY: ÜBER FUSION (SUPER FUSION) 
We drew lessons from the terrible events at Munich, when 
everything went as wrong as it could go. That terrible attack 
marked a turning point in the country's history. We were naive 
then. Today we're prepared. 
Wolfgang Schaeuble, German Interior Minister, June 9, 2006 
Recalling terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics 
 
Immediately following 9/11, Germany passed legislation to consolidate 
counterterrorism efforts among the federal police agencies and improve their 
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prevention capabilities (Hellmuth, 2009, pp. 1–2). The 2001 Anti-Terror Package 
was intended to provide a more centralized approach to counterterrorism efforts 
by fusing together police intelligence and analysis capabilities and enhancing the 
sharing of information among various departments (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 2). To that 
end, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre, called “Gemeinsames 
Terrorismusabwehrzentrum” or GTAZ for short, was created in 2004 to assist in 
collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence among 40 separate agencies, 
including federal and state (known as “Länder”) representatives (Hellmuth, 2009, 
p. 2). Similar to the UK’s JTAC, the GTAZ consists of law enforcement, 
intelligence, and security services (Neve, Vervoorn, Leeuw, & Bogaerts, 2006, 
pp. 45–46). In fact, all 32 Länder security agencies are GTAZ participants, in 
addition to federal, judicial, and even foreign law enforcement personnel 
(Hellmuth, 2009, p. 4). The GTAZ is based in Berlin and consists of roughly 200 
personnel from federal and national police agencies and the Federal Intelligence 
Service (Mauer, 2007, p. 68). As a result of this widespread participation, 
German Chancellor Merkel has commented on the “spirit of cooperation” that has 
been fostered among agencies participating in the GTAZ in their efforts to share 
information and prevent terrorist acts (The Federal Chancellor, Press and 
Information Office, 2007).  
It is interesting to note, while all Länder within Germany are represented 
within the GTAZ, very few state agencies in the U.S. participate in the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in Washington D.C. (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 3). This 
difference in strategy and/or structure can be based in part on the disparate size 
of both nations. Having representatives from all 50 states assigned year-round to 
the NCTC can undoubtedly present logistical challenges for many states given 
their distance from Washington D.C. Instead of hosting representatives from 
each state at the NCTC, federal agencies, such as DHS and FBI, have elected to 
embed analysts in many of the 72 state, regional, and/or local fusion centers 
currently operating within the U.S. (Strohm, 2009).  
 99
Similar to the JTAC in the UK, the GTAZ and other Länder operated 
intelligence centers in Germany are intended to fill the information gap among 
law enforcement and intelligence services and do not contain representatives 
from other disciplines, such as fire, health, or emergency medical services 
(Hellmuth, 2009, p. 4). While the majority of fusion centers in the U.S. have been 
moving towards the adoption of an “all crimes” or “all hazards” mission, the 
intelligence centers in Germany and the UK have remained focused exclusively 
on counterterrorism. By doing so, Germany’s GTAZ, much like their JTAC 
counterpart in the UK, appears to have greater consistency in terms of 
participating agencies, as they are primarily law enforcement and intelligence 
based (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 4).  
Unlike the UK’s JTAC, the GTAZ does not have an appointed director 
(Jackson & Warnes, 2009, p. 109) and operates in large part from separate 
facilities within the GTAZ facility, as opposed to a centralized command center 
(Hellmuth, 2009, pp. 4–5). Participating law enforcement agencies, for example, 
are physically housed in one portion of the GTAZ, while the intelligence agencies 
are located in a separate part of the campus (Wieck, 2006, p. 5). This unique 
structure represents a conscious effort by the German government to avoid legal 
challenges that would likely occur if intelligence and law enforcement functions 
were consolidated into a new agency (Glaessner, 2009, p. 15). Accordingly, both 
entities—law enforcement and intelligence—remain under their own respective 
command structures, but meet daily at the GTAZ to share intelligence information 
(Hellmuth, 2009, p. 5). In addition to conducting daily briefings among 
participating agencies, the GTAZ routinely prepares threat assessments (in the 
form of daily reports), shares resources, gathers intelligence, and strives to 
enhance information sharing to assist with active terrorism investigations 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior, Undated). Since participating federal and Länder 
agencies can continue to work from their own respective commands, a greater 
number of law enforcement and intelligence agencies have elected to participate 
in GTAZ (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 4).  
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In addition to participating in the GTAZ, several Länder within Germany 
have elected to create their own intelligence centers to help safeguard their own 
respective operational areas (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 2). This is not unlike the 
presence of state, regional, and locally managed fusion centers here in the 
United States. Under Germany’s current political structure, the Länder wield 
tremendous power when it comes to shaping counterterrorism procedures 
throughout Germany, as they possess the authority to veto many 
counterterrorism policies enacted by Parliament (Hellmuth, 2009, p. 2). In fact, 
the Länder have historically blocked attempts by the German Parliament to give 
federal authorities oversight surrounding all law enforcement intelligence 
(Hellmuth, 2009, pp. 2–3). Not only have the Länder been successful in 
preventing Parliament’s efforts essentially to federalize intelligence, they have 
prevailed in acquiring access to intelligence information contained in the national 
anti-terrorism database (Hellmuth, 2009, pp. 2-3). The political power of the 
Länder is further illustrated by the fact they have been active participants in 
designing federal database standards and are not merely users of the system 
(Hellmuth, 2009, p. 3). While Germany has pursued information sharing with 
other countries in the European Union, and encouraged interoperability among 
their various criminal databases, almost 80 percent of the terrorist information 
contained in the antiterrorism database originates from Germany (Mauer, 2007, 
p. 72). The overwhelming percentage of German-based intelligence in the 
antiterrorism database suggests a robust system of collection and information 
sharing among German law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
C. ANALYSIS 
By analyzing both the UK’s and Germany’s joint intelligence center 
models, it is feasible that specific recommendations or “lessons learned” can be 
identified, which, if implemented, can benefit the STTAC and California’s overall 
fusion center system. In conducting this assessment, the following categories are 
explored: mission, composition, governance, collaboration, information sharing, 
and funding and sustainability.  
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1. Mission 
The common “counterterrorism” focus among intelligence centers in the 
UK and Germany provides a standardized mission for seeking to prevent terrorist 
acts, through enhanced collaboration and information sharing. Having this 
common goal appears to have assisted both nations in attaining widespread 
participation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies at various levels of 
government. Although adopting a standardized mission towards terrorism only 
has been effective in both the UK and Germany, this approach is inconsistent 
with federal guidance here in the United States and the current trend of fusion 
centers nationwide. According to the report entitled Baseline Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, centers electing not to adopt an all 
crimes or all hazards structure must annually justify their reasons for not doing so 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 7). 
Additionally, while most fusion centers in the United States started with a similar 
counterterrorism design, the majority have broadened their scope over the past 
few years to include an “all crimes” or “all hazards” emphasis (Rollins, 2008, p. 
21). Since the success attributed to the common mission shared by joint 
intelligence centers in the UK and Germany is based on a counterterrorism 
model, an inference can be made that a consistent all crimes or all hazards 
mission might also promote positive results. Currently, the STTAC has employed 
a terrorism only mission, while most of the RTTACs have adopted an all crimes 
approach or are in the process of doing so. Since California’s STTAS is based on 
the collective efforts of the STTAC and four RTTACs, a consistent mission, as 
demonstrated by the UK and German intelligence systems, may offer the STTAC 
and California’s STTAS a more standardized approach towards safeguarding the 
state. 
2. Composition 
In addition to having a common mission, the UK and German intelligence 
center models employ a similar structure regarding agency participation. Both 
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countries have focused on building a successful information-sharing environment 
between law enforcement and the intelligence community. U.S. fusion center 
guidelines, on the other hand, have historically recommended that centers be 
comprised of multiple disciplines from various levels of government and the 
private sector, such as law enforcement, emergency services, public health, etc. 
(U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 3). 
Unlike the UK and Germany, most fusion centers in the United States tend to 
have a less standardized and more diverse range of fusion center participants, 
which can differ largely from fusion center to fusion center. California is no 
exception. In addition to the STTAC and RTTACs pursuing independent missions 
for their respective centers—counterterrorism, all crimes, or all hazards—each 
have elected to include different agencies/disciplines as part of their operations. 
As such, the composition of the STTAC and RTTACs are currently very different.  
Since the standard composition of participating agencies in the UK and 
Germany has been credited with enhancing collaboration and information sharing 
within their respective centers, developing a mutually agreed upon set of core 
disciplines for the STTAC and RTTACs may offer similar benefits for California. 
For example, if the commanders agree that fire service participation is desirable 
in all of California’s fusion centers, the likelihood of fire departments wanting to 
participate may be increased given their potential to collaborate and share 
information with similar agencies statewide. Moreover, since local fire 
departments are already familiar and work closely with their state and local 
counterparts during mutual aid events, bringing those pre-established working 
relationships into the fusion centers may ultimately serve as a bridge to improve 
collaboration between centers. A similar argument can be made for other state 
and local disciplines that participate as a core element, provided positive working 
relationships are established and information is shared. 
 103
3. Governance 
The UK and Germany have addressed the management and governance 
of their respective centers in an entirely different manner. Under the UK system, 
a clearly defined chain of command exists as to who manages the JTAC and a 
formal governance system is in place to help ensure its overall efficiency. The 
German system, conversely, is more loosely constructed without a designated 
leader or prescribed governance process. While these two approaches to 
governance are dissimilar, comparisons to both the UK and German models can 
be found in California’s current fusion center system.  
Similar to the UK, the four RTTACs each have an assigned fusion center 
director and a locally established governance board, which provides direction to 
their respective center. The STTAC, on the other hand, was originally created as 
an equal partnership between OHS, CHP, and DOJ, with no formal leader or 
designated governance board—similar to the German system. The STTAC’s 
“management by consensus” approach has at times led to operational 
differences among the participating agencies without providing a clearly defined 
mechanism—director or governance board—to help resolve disputes (State 
homeland security professional, personal conversation, 2009). The recent 
decision to have CHP take command of the STTAC appears more in-line with the 
UK model and that of the RTTACs. While each of the four RTTACs in California 
has established its own separate governance board, as recommended by 
Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department 
of Justice, 2008, pp. 23–24), the STTAC only recently followed suit. With the 
transfer of management oversight to the CHP, the STTAC recently implemented 
a governance structure that consists of the three primary participating agencies—
CHP, California DOJ, and Cal EMA. While the STTAC’s governance process is 




Germany’s GTAZ ostensibly places emphasis on “joint intelligence” as a 
product resulting from greater collaboration, as opposed to being the derivative of 
a physical structure or “center.” Under Germany’s loosely constructed system, 
building relationships, communication, and a common information-sharing 
platform are seen as more important than building a single operations center to 
house participating organizations jointly. In contrast, the term “fusion center” in 
the United States, including California, may tend to overemphasize the 
importance of the physical “center” itself, as opposed to the “fusion” or 
collaborative process it is intended to promote. The U.S. model appears focused 
on creating the center first and collaboration second, while the German model 
seemingly sees collaboration first and the center as perhaps unimportant. This 
observation may offer some insight into why some fusion centers in the United 
States tend to view themselves as being in competition with other centers 
(Rollins, 2008, p. 8).  
5. Information Sharing 
Unlike the UK, Germany’s information sharing model was the result of 
legislation and a national effort to construct a common communications platform 
through which federal and Länder-based law enforcement and intelligence 
organizations can input and share information. Länder were afforded the 
opportunity to provide input into the design of the national database (Hellmuth, 
2009, p. 3), and all 16 Interior Ministers from the Länder agreed on the database 
and the parameters for its use (Riecker, 2006). Having a voice in the construction 
and development of the database may ultimately help to build “buy-in” among 
stakeholders and end users, as they are participants in the overall design. The 
end result has been the creation of a single system consistently utilized by 
agencies throughout Germany. 
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While the United States has developed multiple information-sharing 
systems in an effort to provide fusion centers with the tools necessary to collect, 
analyze, and share intelligence information, many of those systems were 
developed without direct input from the fusion centers themselves and have 
subsequently received varying degrees of support (Deffer, 2006, p. 4). The 
widespread availability of multiple federal, state, local, and commercially 
developed platforms provides individual centers with many options—perhaps too 
many. Under the current system in California, for example, the STTAC and 
RTTACs have the ability individually to pursue whatever system(s) they believe 
to be most beneficial to their respective center. While a selected system may 
provide enhanced information sharing capabilities among agencies represented 
within a particular center, it may offer little to no benefit in providing greater 
connectivity and information sharing between the other RTTACs and/or STTAC. 
Drawing from the experiences of the German system, efforts can be taken to 
create buy-in among the STTAC and RTTACs as to the best method(s) for 
attaining enhanced information sharing between all of California’s centers and 
potentially others across the nation. 
6. Funding and Sustainability 
Similar to the United States, both the UK and German efforts towards 
enhanced intelligence sharing have been financially supported by their respective 
governments. Unlike the UK and U.S. models, Germany appears to have placed 
less emphasis on the need for a co-located command center. Instead, it has 
focused its attention and resources towards daily meetings and the development 
of a standardized national system for collecting, analyzing, and sharing 
information across agencies. Since the lease costs associated with California’s 
co-located fusion centers collectively represent several million dollars annually 
(State homeland security official, personal conversation, 2009), efforts to 
consolidate or reduce the need for on-site participation through greater 
connectivity may offer cost effective solutions. 
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On the subject of sustainability, lessons can be learned from the UK and 
German models to assist fusion centers in the United States, including those in 
California. The UK and German systems, for example, have had considerable 
success in fostering effective partnerships and collaboration among participating 
agencies, including personnel working in the field. Given the fact that staffing 
represents one of the critical factors in fusion center sustainability, efforts to build 
effective partnerships must continue to be a high priority. Additionally, given the 
current economic crisis in the United States and California, future sustainability is 
also predicated in large part on the ability for centers to remain fully funded. 
Currently, funding for the STTAC is derived entirely through federal grants; 
making it susceptible to collapse, should federal funding be reduced or 
eliminated entirely. In the face of this potential vulnerability, Germany’s GTAZ 
structure offers a viable solution. Space limitations at the current facility severely 
restrict the number of agencies physically assigned to the STTAC. As the GTAZ 
model suggests, participation in the STTAC should not be based on whether or 
not adequate space for an agency inside the STTAC facility exists. Instead, 
participation should be based on whether inclusion of an agency is deemed 
critical towards safeguarding California. In the current fiscal environment, it may 
make more sense to have adjunct agencies participating from their own 
workplace—similar to the GTAZ—and either reporting to the facility on an as-
needed basis or through remote connectivity. This method appears to offer a 
feasible solution to centers faced with the unpopular decision of physically 
closing due to funding limitations or who lack sufficient space to include 
additional partners. The potential use of virtual fusion centers as a connectivity 
option is also supported by the Findings and Recommendations of the 
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project, which 
encourages the development virtual platforms to enable information sharing 
among regional partners and to permit remote access by law enforcement 
officers in the field (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008, pp. 19–20).  
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VIII. IN SEARCH OF GREATER COLLABORATION BETWEEN 
CALIFORNIA’S STATE AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTERS 
Fusion Centers embody the core of collaboration and as 
demands increase and resources decrease, fusion centers will 
become an effective tool to maximize available resources and 
build trusted relationships. 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 4) 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The widely held definition of fusion centers starts with the premise that “a 
fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies….” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 12). The 
words “collaborative,” “collaboration,” and other variations of the root word 
“collaborate” are mentioned 74 times in Fusion Center Guidelines and are 
discussed an additional 11 times in Baseline Capabilities. In fact, Fusion Center 
Guidelines contends, “fusion centers embody the core of collaboration” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, pp. 4, 12).  
This chapter examines the role and importance collaboration plays in 
fusion center operations. In doing so, the significance of collaboration not only 
within fusion centers, but between fusion centers is studied, and possible 
methods for strengthening collaboration within the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center (STTAC) and among California’s statewide network of fusion 
centers, the State Terrorism Threat Assessment System explored (STTAS). 
B. COLLABORATION AND RELATED TERMS DEFINED 
Webster’s dictionary defines the word “collaboration” as “work[ing] jointly 
with others or together, especially in an intellectual endeavor” (Merriam-Webster, 
2010) While collaboration is often associated with “cooperation” and 
“coordination,” it is important to understand the distinctions between these three 
terms, as they are arguably not synonymous, nor completely interchangeable.  




and trust of a diverse 
group of men and women 
who believe in the power 
of collaboration.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 1) 
The word “coordination,” for example, can apply to situations where no 
direct relationship exists between individuals or groups and in which each entity 
merely considers the activities of another person or group to avoid potential 
conflicts (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, p. 53). “Cooperation,” on the other hand, 
can describe circumstances where individuals or groups do interact with each 
other, but simply do so as a means of allowing each other to achieve their own 
goals or objectives, but not necessarily those 
of the collective group (Huxham & 
Macdonald, 1992, p. 53). Finally, the term 
“collaboration,” as the author intends to use it 
throughout this chapter and the remainder of 
this thesis, refers to situations in which 
individuals or groups work together to 
achieve some common mission or purpose, 
while also continuing to meet their own 
individual or group objectives (Huxham & 
Macdonald, 1992, p. 53). This is an importa
coordination alone cannot ensure that individuals, groups, organizations, 
agencies, or fusion centers work jointly together to achieve a common objective. 
Collaboration, as defined above, is the fundamental adhesive necessary to “fuse” 
the combined efforts of California’s fusion centers together towards a common 
purpose or objective. 
nt distinction, as cooperation and 
C. THE CALL FOR COLLABORATION IN AND BETWEEN FUSION 
CENTERS 
As articulated in Fusion Center Guidelines, fusion centers are intended to 
amass a diverse group of agencies and disciplines representing various levels of 
government and other sectors within a “collaborative environment” intended to 
support the collective goal of “maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, 
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investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, pp. 12–13). 
The underlying question is how to create a “collaborative environment” not only 
within the confines of individual fusion centers, like the STTAC, but also across a 
network of fusion centers, such as California’s STTAS. 
 109
“Collaboration is vital to 
the success of fusion 
centers.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 17)
Fusion Center Guidelines offers some insights into this theoretical 
question by providing recommended “guidelines” intended to promote a more 
collaborative environment within fusion centers. These guidelines include the 
need to develop joint mission statements, goals, and objectives that fusion 
(center participants collectively support (Guideline 2); the importance of 
stablishing a collaborative working 
nvironment through diverse participation and 
pportunities for information sharing 
Guideline 4); and the value of establishing an 
Guideline 5), which Fusion Center Guidelines 
argues is the “foundation of a collaborative initiative founded on trust….” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 5). By 
striving to build and maintain greater collaboration among fusion center 
participants, Fusion Center Guidelines states a more consistent and unified 
approach towards achieving common goals can be realized (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 10). In addition, 
establishing a collaborative environment is also an important part of sharing 
ownership and decisions among fusion center partners (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, 2006, p. 29), 
as successful inter-agency collaboration requires effective and committed 
leadership from each of the participating agencies (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 3)  
e
e
frequent interaction to create greater 
o
(
MOU among fusion center participants 
(
While Fusion Center Guidelines focuses in large part on building 
collaboration within the context of individual fusion centers, it offers little guidance 
on precisely how to attain meaningful collaboration between multiple centers, 
especially over great distances, where face-to-face contact and direct 
interpersonal exchanges are by their very nature limited—like California’s 
STTAS. In fact, most of the current literature on fusion centers, as highlighted in 
the Literature Review (Chapter II), focuses predominantly on what the author 
refers to as “intra-fusion center” collaboration, where participants are largely 
assembled within a collocated facility or in close proximity to one another.  
Although the recommendations and competencies outlined in Fusion 
Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities are not exclusively intended for 
intra-fusion center operations and are equally desirable and necessary for “inter-
fusion center” or “center-to-center” relationships, the challenge becomes how 
best to enable or strengthen collaboration between centers physically separated, 
independently managed, and already engaged in other collaborative 
relationships among participants within their respective jurisdictions. As the 
STTAC and Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs) each 
work independently to build collaboration and pursue mutually identified goals 
within their individual areas of responsibility, they are also called upon to work 
collectively as part of a separate statewide collaborative enterprise that requires 
the development of mutually negotiated statewide objectives, which may or may 
not match those previously negotiated at the local level. In many ways, the 
collaborative relationship being collectively sought among all five STTAS 
participants—the STTAC and four RTTACs—can more accurately be described a 
“collaboration of collaborations,” with California’s STTAS serving as an 
overarching collaborative structure or “overlay” comprised of five fusion centers, 
each having their own preexisting collaborative associations. Figure 10 shows a 
conceptual model depicting the desired end state for collaboration among the 




California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), Los Angeles Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center (JRIC), and San Diego (SD) RTTAC seamlessly connected 
as part of a collaborative statewide system. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Conceptual STTAS Collaboration Model 
While Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities provides sound 
counsel on the strategic and technical skills and capabilities required of state and 
local fusion centers through interagency collaboration, the roadmap for 
empowering horizontal inter-fusion center collaboration among multiple centers is 
a chapter yet unwritten. Therefore, the balance of this chapter and, largely, the 
remainder of this thesis, explores ways to strengthen center-to-center 
 111
collaboration among California’s distributed 
network of state and regional fusion centers 
operating within the STTAS. 
“Collaboration begins 
with interpersonal 








D. DEVELOPING INTERPERSONAL 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 29)
More often than not, collaboration 
starts with the formation of sound 
interpersonal relationships (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29) that 
often stem from individuals or agencies working together in a collocated 
environment towards some common goal or objective (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005, p. 9). In fact, the majority of federal 
guidance related to fusion centers touts the benefits of having agencies working 
together in a common or shared work location, so that interpersonal relationships 
and improved communication can develop through daily, face-to-face contact 
(U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 
47).  
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“To ensure the 
effectiveness of 
collaboration with the 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 30)
To help illustrate the benefits of agency collocation, studies have shown 
that fusion centers having dedicated Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
ersonnel assigned to them customarily 
eport having stronger working relationships 
nd greater collaboration with DHS than 
enters that do not have a full-time DHS 
epresentative (U.S. Department of 
omeland Security, Office of the Inspector 
eneral, 2008, p. 37). For similar reasons, 
ther publications recommend conducting 











an effort to foster greater personal contact, strengthen interpersonal 
relationships, and help promote interagency collaboration (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, 2006, p. 30). 
While agencies working together within an common business location are 
afforded the opportunity to interact with and develop interpersonal relationships 
among the people and agencies they work side-by-side with on a daily basis, the 
challenge becomes how to build interpersonal relationships between separate 
fusion centers not collocated, which may not interact with each other on a daily 
basis, and whose general staff may not have met or been afforded the 
opportunity to establish a personal relationship with personnel in the other 
center(s). Research on distant interagency collaborations concedes that 
collaboration is not easily attained in situations where participants are physically 
separated and do not have the opportunity to frequently meet and work directly 
with each other (Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 717). Due to the inherent 
difficulties physical separation can cause in regards to interpersonal contact, 
finding alternative solutions to increase interpersonal relationships, center-to-
center interaction, and to promote greater collaboration among the center 
participants is highly desirable (Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 717). One 
of the recommended ways of enhancing collaboration within a distributed 
network, such as the STTAS, is through the formation of work groups with a 
specific purpose or goal in mind (Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 718).  
To their credit, the RTTAC and STTAC commanders have implemented a 
number of alternative solutions designed to increase interpersonal relationships 
and/or coordination through the establishment of various work groups and 
standing inter-fusion center committees (RTTAC and STTAC commanders, 
personal communication, 2010). One such method has been the implementation 
of quarterly STTAS commanders meetings, in which the STTAC and RTTAC 
commanders meet jointly to discuss operational issues among each other and 
with other STTAS stakeholders, such as DHS, California Highway Patrol (CHP), 
California Department of Justice (DOJ), and California Emergency Management 
“Inherent in a 
collaborative 
environment is two-way 
communication.” 
Agency (Cal EMA). These meetings provide commanders the ability to meet 
face-to-face on a recurring basis, where they can get to know one another and 
potentially strengthen interpersonal 
relationships, trust, and the willingness to 
collaborate among themselves and their 
respective centers.  
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 29)
In January 2009, a Lead Analysts 
Working Group (LAWG) was also created to 
provide senior analysts from the STTAC and 
RTTACs the ability to interact more frequently through weekly phone calls and 
monthly meetings (RTTAC and STTAC commanders, personal communication, 
2010). These forums provide lead analysts from the STTAC and RTTACs the 
ability to discuss analytical products and other collaborative endeavors on an 
ongoing basis, while also affording the opportunity to establish and/or strengthen 
interpersonal relationships that might otherwise be physically prohibitive due to 
their separate geographical locations and lack of a common work area. Similarly, 
the managers of each center’s Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program have 
created a standing work group that enables ongoing contact with their respective 
counterparts in an effort to increase the effectiveness of their collective efforts 
through heightened interpersonal relationships (RTTAC and STTAC 
commanders, personal communication, 2010).  
In addition to the methods outlined above, one prospective technique for 
increasing interpersonal contact and potentially enhancing interpersonal 
relationships between the STTAC and RTTACs, not currently being utilized, 
involves the use of existing video conferencing capabilities, which each of 
California’s fusion centers currently possess. By utilizing this technological bridge 
between centers on a recurring basis, “virtual” face-to-face contact between 




opportunity to meet with their respective counterparts can be afforded the 
opportunity to experience direct contact with each other through a common 
virtual work environment. 
E. THE IMPACT OF TRUST ON COLLABORATION 
“Successful collaboration 
is contingent upon a 
trusting environment.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 29)
In his book, The Speed of Trust, Stephen M. R. Covey defines “trust” as 
“confidence” and “mistrust” as “suspicion” (Covey, 2006, p. 5). To promote 
collaboration within fusion centers, one must 
first develop an environment among 
participants in which trust is present (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29). In fact, 
Fusion Center Guidelines argues that 
“successful collaboration is contingent upon a 
trusting environment” (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006, p. 29). The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan also 
acknowledges the critical relationship between trust and information sharing by 
pointing out that information and intelligence sharing are predicated upon 
foundational trust between parties and that trust can weaken or vanish in 
situations where real or perceived concerns are held by either party in a 
interagency relationship (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2005, p. 9). Since collaboration and information sharing are arguably 
voluntary actions in which each party can ultimately decide whether to engage in 
the collaboration or to what extent or with whom they share information, trust 
seemingly has the ability to make or break the collaborative and information 
sharing process. This assertion is further supported by literature that finds in 
situations where trust and interpersonal relationships are strained, collaboration 
is also adversely impacted (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29). The lack of trusted partnerships is also cited 
as one of the principal obstacles to collaboration (U.S. Department of Homeland 












“Fostering a collaborative 




provides individual as 
well as a collective 
ownership in the mission 
and goals of the center”
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 29)
s mentioned previously in Chapter I, 
he absence of full time law enforcement or 
ultiagency participation within the STTAC 
or an extended period of time negatively 
mpacted its ability to collaborate with the 
TTACs and other federal, state, and local 
takeholders (Federal, state, and local 
omeland security professionals, personal 
ommunication, 2008). As the STTAC seeks 
o rebuild multiagency participation, trust, and 
ollaboration within its internal operations, it 
must also focus on building trust and collaboration externally with the RTTACs 
and other homeland security stakeholders.  
With the recent installation of a new management team within the STTAC 
and a newly signed MOU in place between CHP, California DOJ, and Cal EMA, 
efforts have been underway collaboratively to redefine the STTAC’s mission, 
develop a formal mission statement, create a strategic plan, adopt a 
comprehensive security agreement, and implement an appropriate governance 
system (State homeland security professionals, personal communication, 2009), 
in part, to instill greater “confidence” or “trust” both internally and externally and 
foster enhanced collaboration. While initial changes in the STTAC’s management 
structure have been viewed favorably by various internal and external 
stakeholders (Homeland security professionals, personal communication, 2009), 
long-term impressions are largely dependent on the STTAC’s ability to follow 
through on its promises and commitments (Covey, 2006, pp. 45–46). In fact, 
Covey argues that keeping commitments is one of the fastest ways to build or 
restore trust (Covey, 2006, p. 13). Since building trust is largely a function of both 
character and competency (Covey, 2006, p. 30), the STTAC must not only 
demonstrate integrity as an organization, it must also show its competency to 
produce positive results to increase trust and collaboration among internal and 
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external stakeholders (Covey, 2006, pp. 44–54). A significant part of these 
character-related functions is dependent upon the STTAC following through on 
its promises and commitments. As highlighted in The Speed of Trust, one 
method for doing so is to develop a mission statement with input from critical 
stakeholders and subsequently abiding by it (Covey, 2006, p. 78). More 
importantly, the STTAC must produce results, or what Covey refers to as “fruit,” 
to help build credibility, as consistent accomplishments are likely to have a far 
greater impact on trust and credibility than the mission statement itself (Covey, 
2006, p. 128). In fact, producing results is perhaps one of the most effective 
means of converting skeptics or naysayers into “believers” by increasing trust 
(Covey, 2006, p. 174).  
As the STTAC attempts to enhance trust and credibility through positive 
results and sustained performance, one model worthy of consideration advocates 
utilizing a cyclical process that begins in pursuit of small milestones and 
eventually increases to more complicated goals as trust is propagated. Through 
this proposed methodology: (1) parties start out in pursuit of attainable goals that 
can reasonably be achieved; (2) through repeated successful performance, 
participants build greater trust; and (3) as trust builds, participants seek more 
ambitious goals and collaboration (Vangen & Huxham, 2003, pp. 10–14).  
F. COLLABORATION AT A DISTANCE: BUILDING COLLABORATION 
AMONG DISPERSED ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS 
Given the dispersed geographical and organizational nature of state and 
local fusion centers, the relationship among centers is often referred to as a 
“network.” In fact, an advanced search through Google on the words “fusion AND 
center AND network” revealed 13,600,000 possible references containing all 
three terms (Google, 2010). The National Strategy for Information Sharing calls 
for the creation of a national network of fusion centers (President of the United 
States, 2007, p. 11), and California’s Homeland Security Strategy also refers to 
the STTAC and RTTACs as being information networks on at least one occasion 
(Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 76). This segment, discusses 
research conducted on interagency collaboration among “networks” of 
organizations in hopes of identifying key principles and methods for 
strengthening collaboration among California’s state and regional fusion centers. 
For purposes of this discussion, it may be helpful to define the term “network,” as 
used in this chapter. 
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jointly toward a common 
goal.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 12)
A network is “an organizational system capable of congregating 
individuals and institutions…around common themes and/or objectives” (Santoro, 
Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 716). It is established through interconnected 
horizontal relationships—much like state and local fusion centers—brought 
together for collaborative goals and objectives (Chisholm, 1998). Using network 
organizations, people or organizations geographically separated can be brought 
together as part of a multidisciplinary effort to address a common problem 
Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 716). 
he challenge becomes how to manage 
hese distant relationships using conventional 
ethods when they are individually self-
overned and sometimes separated by great 
istances, similar to the fusion centers within 
TTAS (Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, 
. 716). Unlike a hierarchical structure with an 
entified leader, collaborative relationships 
volving different organizations require a new 
type of leadership in which groups can be influenced in a particular direction 
through diplomacy, persuasion, and other interpersonal skills (Huxham & 











Since collaborative inter-organizational relationships are horizontal, as 
opposed to hierarchical, and generally lack a centralized authority that controls 
the efforts of all participants, similar to the STTAS, they are governed in large 
part through compromise and negotiation by participating organizations (Phillips, 
Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000, pp. 26, 33). This begs the question, when using 
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negotiation and compromise, how is it possible to entice participants within the 
STTAS to want to strengthen and increase horizontal collaboration with each 
other as part of a statewide network? One possible answer worthy of exploration 
can be found in the theory of “collaborative advantage.” 
G. COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE THEORY: SEEKING TO CREATE 
ADDED VALUE AND COLLABORATIVE SYNERGY AMONG 
CALIFORNIA’S FUSION CENTERS 
1. Collaborative Advantage and Collaborative Inertia Defined 
The term “collaborative advantage” refers to the achievement of a specific 
goal, objective, or capacity through interagency collaboration that none of the 
participating organizations or entities can achieve on their own and from which 
everyone who participates in the collaboration ultimately benefits (Huxham, 1993, 
p. 603). Collaborative advantage strives to create a synergistic relationship 
among organizations participating in the collaboration (Huxham, 1993, p. 603), 
while acknowledging the fact that for participants to derive an “advantage” from 
participating in the collaboration, they must gain some benefit from doing so 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2004, p. 11). Ultimately, collaborative advantage provides 
an incentive for individual organizations to participate and collaborate with one 
another because they each derive value from the end product or objective. 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 772).  
The concept of “collaborative inertia,” conversely, refers to instances 
where the effectiveness of a collaborative process seemingly degrades or stalls 
and, subsequently, the desired results are significantly less than anticipated 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2004, p. 11). Factors that can lead to collaborative inertia 
include disagreements over goals, different organizational cultures or structures, 
as well as issues related to trust and accountability (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, 
pp. 798–799). In many cases, identifying the appropriate stakeholders to be 
included in the collaboration can be an important factor in determining whether 
the relationship leads to collaborative advantage or is destined for collaborative 
inertia (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 773).  
In certain instances, collaborative advantage can also result in the 
fulfillment of higher-level outcomes that benefit not only the participants, but the 
general public as well (Huxham, 1993, p. 603). Given the primary public safety 
related objectives of fusion centers, should collaborative advantage be 
successfully attained among California’s fusion centers, the potential for higher 
level benefits to the public also appears promising.  
2. Applying Collaborative Advantage to the STTAC and RTTACs 
As defined in the preceding section, collaborative advantage theory 
appears consistent with one of the primary collaboration principles outlined in 
Fusion Center Guidelines, which argues that successful fusion center 
collaborations must provide added value to the customers, participants, and 
other community stakeholders (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006, p. 30). 
“A successful 
collaboration must 
continually provide value 




(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 30)
One of the first steps in pursuing 
collaborative advantage is for participating 
organizations to agree on collaborative goals 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2004, p. 12) and to 
define their relationship collaboratively 
(Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, p. 53), which 
can sometimes be hindered by competing 
self-interests. For California’s STTAS, this 
means developing collective goals and objectives among the STTAC and 
RTTACs that each center subscribes to, and which, clearly defines each center’s 
role and responsibility in the collaboration. While the current STTAS Business 
Plan and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) acknowledges the intent for 
California’s state and regional fusion centers to have a collaborative relationship, 
the present version falls short of providing the collaborative strategic vision, 
objectives, roles and responsibilities of the overarching collaborative relationship 
or its individual parties (California homeland security professionals, personal 
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communication, 2009). This first step of clearly establishing collaborative goals 
and defining the collaborative relationship is consistent with recommendations 
outlined in Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities, which calls upon 
fusion centers to identify the roles, responsibilities, and mission of each center 
through a collaborative process (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 12; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, p. 5). Doing so is supported by a recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that found that clearly defining 
roles and responsibilities and coordinating efforts can improve interagency 
collaboration (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009, p. 4).  
The act of defining interagency collaboration often involves balancing the 
individual interests of those directly involved in the negotiation, the interests of 
their respective organizations and, ultimately, the desired outcome or intended 
purpose of the collaborative relationship itself (Huxham & Vangen, 2004, p. 12). 
Significant differences among these three perspectives (individual, organization, 
and collaboration) can result in possible conflicts of interest that adversely impact 
collaboration either directly or indirectly (Huxham & Vangen, 2004, p. 12). 
Subsequently, it is imperative that the STTAC and RTTACs define and establish 
collaborative goals, objectives, roles, and responsibilities not only mutually 
acceptable to all of the participants, but that also do not conflict with the mission, 
goals, and objectives of their individual centers and their independent 
governance systems. 
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“Developing the center 
mission statement and 
goals collaboratively with 
participating 
entities…will create 
ownership and assist in 
identifying the primary 
role(s) of the 
organization.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23)
Research also suggests that to achieve collaborative advantage, 
participating organizations should consider developing a shared “meta-strategy” 
r overarching strategic-level statement for 
he collaboration that clearly defines their 
ission and objectives (Huxham & 
acdonald, 1992, p. 53). One method for 
oing so is to utilize a “group decision 
upport” process to permit participants to 
efine the collaboration collectively 
Huxham, 1991, p. 1040). Several of the 
outed benefits, include (Huxham & 
acdonald, 1992, pp. 53–55): (1) helping to 
ake the goals and objectives explicit to all 
stakeholders; (2) allowing participants to determine whether individual roles and 
responsibilities are being fulfilled; (3) helping to instill a collaborative versus 
competitive atmosphere between stakeholders; and (4) providing a decisive and 
articulable plan that can be marketed to stakeholders, customers, or other 
persons of interest. Since the STTAC and RTTAC commanders have each 
requested that the current STTAS Business Plan and Concept of Operations be 
reexamined and amended (STTAC and RTTAC commanders, personal 
communication, 2009), the opportunity to create a new STTAS meta-strategy that 
collaboratively defines the strategic objectives for the STTAS, along with its 
mission, roles and responsibilities, appears both feasible and warranted. In fact, 
a recent GAO report examining interagency collaboration found that developing 
“overarching strategies can help agencies overcome differences in missions, 
cultures, and ways of doing business by providing strategic direction for 












Finally, it is important to recognize that collaborations, including those 
between the STTAC and RTTACs, are often in a state of constant change from 
internal and external factors, such as personnel changes, political pressure, new 
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leadership, new participants, loss of agency participation, etc. (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2000, pp. 789–795). Changes often lead to the need to renegotiate, as 
new participants often bring new ideas and agendas (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, 
p. 799). Therefore, maintaining collaborative advantage requires perpetual trust 
building, nurturing of current and new relationships, and managing risks 
associated with instabilities inherent with change (Beech & Huxham, 2003). 
H. LEADING HORIZONTALLY AND ACHIEVING COLLABORATIVE 
SOLUTIONS AS A “MEGACOMMUNITY” 
The authors of the book Megacommunities describe a “megacommunity” 
as being an intentional effort to bring “communities of organizations” together to 
attain goals and objectives not accomplishable alone (Gerencser, Van Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 28). That generic and perhaps oversimplified 
definition appears consistent with the concept of “collaborative advantage,” as 
discussed in the previous section, and the basic objectives of the STTAS, in that 
it too seeks to create a higher collective achievement—safeguarding California—
than the STTAC or RTTACs can individually provide.  
While the book highlights the benefits of multi-organizational and 
collaborative solutions, it acknowledges that participating organizations must also 
be free to pursue their own self-interests and priorities at times (Gerencser, Van 
Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 54). That insight is an important distinction, as 
it is unlikely that the RTTACs or any other governmental, public, or private sector 
stakeholders, currently or prospectively supporting the STTAS, are willing to 
abandon their individual efforts or identity completely in exchange for creating a 
megacommunity. The authors describe this process as “dynamic tension,” in 
which participants “push and pull” against each other in an effort to influence the 
direction of the group’s collective efforts in the absence of a formal leader 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 55). Since there is no central 
decision maker in charge (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 74), 
similar to the STTAS, the megacommunity is more appropriately based on what 
the book calls “permanent negotiation” instead of “collaboration” (Gerencser, Van 
Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 100). Both of these concepts—dynamic 
tension and permanent negotiation—offer value to the STTAS since the 
independent commanders and governance boards of the STTAC and RTTACs, 
as well as other public, private, and governmental stakeholders, may at times 
have competing interests or a different opinion regarding the appropriate 
direction for the STTAS. By committing to the notion of “optimizing” the entire 
STTAS community instead of “maximizing” the benefits to any single self-interest 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 82), the STTAS participants 
are more likely to participate actively in a negotiated decision-making process, in 
which their perspectives and recommendations are equally weighed against 
others in the STTAS community. In doing so, the STTAC and RTTACs can each 
have some influence in directing the state’s combined efforts through the STTAS, 
as opposed to viewing themselves as a stakeholder without an active voice in the 
process. This appears consistent with a principle highlighted in Fusion Center 
Guidelines, which argues that fusion center collaborations must share ownership 
and decision making among their participants (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 29). 
“A collaborative 
environment will result in 
a consistent, unified 
approach to prevention 
and response.” 
 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 10)
As pointed out by the authors of Megacommunities, creating and 
sustaining a megacommunity is as much about the “mindset” as it is about formal 
“mechanisms” (Gerencser, Van Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 80), in that 
participants must be willing to attempt to 
solve problems through their collective 
abilities rather than constantly pursuing 
their own ideas and interests (Gerencser, 
Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 81). 
That characteristic or “mindset” can be 
fostered within the STTAS, provided the STTAC and RTTACs are willing to 




look for and adopt inclusive versus exclusive strategies—what the authors refer 
to as “us and them” instead of “us versus them” solutions (Gerencser, Van Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 193).  
To help transition the STTAS into a megacommunity, strategies must be 
identified to create an environment in which all five fusion centers (the STTAC 
and RTTACs) and other government, public, and private sector stakeholders 
collectively view the STTAS as providing an enhanced value to the state, as well 
as their individual operations (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 
116). The CHP has recently attempted to become an “initiator” in that effort 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 120) by agreeing to assume a 
leadership role in the STTAC and by attempting to implement increased 
efficiencies within the STTAS. The following strategies, as outlined in 
Megacommunities, offer potential solutions for organizing the STTAS into an 
effective megacommunity:  
1. Conduct “Future Search” Meeting(s) 
To help define the needs and direction of the STTAS, a series of open 
discussion meetings should be considered among all stakeholders using a model 
referred to as “future search” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 
166). Future search meetings are intended to last two to three days, include both 
plenary and working group sessions, and help to define the community’s 
aspirations, its current capabilities, and how best to accomplish its goals 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 166). 
2. Define, Monitor, and Measure Performance  
In addition to clarifying its general direction and aspirations of the STTAS 
community through future search meetings, the members should clearly define 
their goals and identify mutually agreeable methods for verifying, monitoring, and 




180–181). Through the aforementioned efforts, megacommunities can determine 
what constitutes success and whether certain milestones are indicative of 
sustained progress or identify the need for recalibration or adjustment.  
3. Negotiate “Floor Measures,” Feedback Mechanisms, and Make 
Adjustments, As Necessary 
Since stakeholders can interpret success from different vantage points, 
Megacommunities recommends that community metrics be defined in the context 
of baseline standards or “floor measures,” as opposed to focusing on the upper 
performance levels (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, pp. 182–
183). Additionally, it is essential that mechanisms be established to obtain and 
evaluate community feedback from megacommunity members on an ongoing 
basis so that adjustments can be negotiated as part of an evolving versus a fixed 
system (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 184). A system that 
can be adjusted through continued negotiations may ultimately serve as an 
enabler for enhanced sustainability (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 
2008, p. 184).  
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Fusion Center Guidelines maintains that “collaboration is vital to the 
success of fusion centers” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006, p. 17), and calls upon leaders to adopt various 
guidelines intended to encourage collaboration among fusion center participants 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 5). 
While current federal guidance on fusion center collaboration focuses 
predominantly on methods to build collaboration among interagency personnel 
working within collocated centers, for intrastate fusion centers like the STTAC 
and RTTACs to coordinate successfully with each on a statewide basis, as called 
for in Baseline Capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008, p. 12), collaboration between fusion centers is 
equally important. 
In examining methods to strengthen collaboration both internally within the 
STTAC and externally between the STTAC and RTTACs, research outlined in 
this chapter supports the assertion that collaboration starts with interpersonal 
relationships (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2006, p. 29), and requires trust between prospective fusion center 
participants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2006, p. 29). Figure 11 depicts collaboration as a vertical equation in which 
interpersonal relationships and trust are shown as sequential steps towards 
achieving collaboration.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Collaboration Equation 
One of the principal challenges examined in this chapter is how to build 
interpersonal relationships, trust and, ultimately, collaboration among dispersed 
organizational fusion center networks physically separated, independently 
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governed, and whose interagency relationships are horizontal in nature and lack 
a centralized authority—like California’s STTAS. Research on the subject of 
distant collaborative relationships showcased the need for greater center-to-
center interaction (Santoro, Borges, & Rezende, 2006, p. 717) and the 
importance of governing through compromise and negotiation (Phillips, 
Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000), through the use of diplomacy, persuasion, and 
interpersonal skills (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 1160). This research of 
collaboration, as highlighted in this chapter, suggests that as interpersonal 
relationships and trust increase, so too does the potential progression for 
collaboration, which Figure 12 illustrates conceptually.  
 
 
Figure 12.   Collaboration Progression 
For collaborations to be successful, they must also provide value to their 
participants, customers, and other stakeholders (U.S. Department of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 30). As discussed in this 
chapter, the theory of collaborative advantage posits that dispersed 
organizations, such as California’s fusion centers, are provided with a greater 
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incentive to collaborate if the result of that collaboration offers a synergistic 
outcome or achievement from which each of the participants benefit and without 
which none of the participants can attain (Huxham, 1993, p. 603). Collaborative 
advantage offers a strong conceptual incentive for independently operated fusion 
centers to collaborate with one another if the benefits for doing so yield additional 
information, intelligence, capacities, or products that the individual centers cannot 
obtain or produce on their own. The underlying question for the STTAC and, 
ultimately, the STTAS, is to explore what services, deliverables, or capacities it 
can offer to the RTTACs that can increase the likelihood of attaining collaborative 
advantage system wide and, thereby, strengthen the horizontal collaborative 
relationships among California’s STTAS.  
Successful inter-agency collaboration requires effective and committed 
leadership from each of the participating agencies (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 3). To build effective collaborative relationships, 
fusion center networks must establish trust among participants, set common 
agreed upon objectives, work collectively towards a common understanding, and 
manage relationships to share authority (Vangen & Huxham, 2006, p. 4). The 
notion of striving to create a “megacommunity” among California’s STTAS 
participants offers possible insights into optimizing the statewide network, leading 
horizontally, and producing enhanced value for California (Gerencser, Van Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 116). Doing so can be achieved by (Gerencser, Van 
Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, pp. 166, 180–183): (1) conducting a “future 
search” meeting among the STTAS participants to more clearly system-wide 
needs and aspirations; (2) defining, monitoring, and measuring performance; and 
(3) negotiating “floor measures” or metrics, obtaining feedback from which 
necessary modifications can be made.  
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
“Coming together is a beginning. 
Keeping together is progress. 




As the author began this thesis, he initially sought to determine what the 
appropriate role is for a state fusion center in states having multiple fusion 
centers. In doing so, he theorized that there might be a single preferable model 
or “best practice” that could be applied in California, and possibly to other states, 
to align California’s state and regional fusion centers more effectively, and, in 
doing so, potentially lay the groundwork to enhance current efforts to build a 
nationwide network of fusion centers. This research leads to the conclusion that 
the author began asking the wrong question, primarily because his hypothesis 
that there might be a single, “one size fits all” pattern or template for state fusion 
centers to consider proved to be invalid. Through this research, he discovered 
that the appropriate role of a state fusion center was largely dependent on what 
state that center was located in, its intended mission, how many other fusion 
centers the state might have, the wants and needs of its customers, political 
deliberations among state and local jurisdictions, and, ultimately, what role was 
collaboratively negotiated and supported by the centers and their participants. 
Subsequently, what might be an appropriate model for California’s state fusion 
center could be completely inappropriate for a state not possessing the same 
needs, structure, political environment, or so forth. Armed with this newly 
informed awareness, the author refined his original primary thesis question to  
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define more explicitly what the appropriate role of the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center (STTAC) is within California’s State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment System (STTAS).  
Throughout this thesis, the author provided detailed analysis and 
recommendations, as appropriate, regarding the data presented in each chapter. 
This final chapter intends to highlight the main points or principal “takeaways” 
from the previous chapters of this thesis as they directly refer to the four main 
thesis research questions. In addition, this chapter presents specific 
recommendations in light of the derived answers to the thesis questions and 
offers recommendations for future research to build upon this body of research.  
B. QUESTIONS 
1. What Is the Appropriate Role of the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center Within California’s State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment System?  
In determining the appropriate “role” of the STTAC, it was important to first 
establish what a designated state fusion center is and, equally important, what it 
is not. While the term “state fusion center” can narrowly refer to the STTAC in the 
context of it being a center managed by a state agency, the broader use of the 
term also takes into consideration the STTAC’s designation as California’s 
primary fusion center among other fusion centers in the state. It is this broader 
definition that this thesis, in large part, seeks to answer. 
The STTAC’s designation as California’s state fusion center, like many 
other state fusion centers across the nation, is not derived from legislation, a 
Governor’s Executive Order, or some other statutory process, but by a 
governor’s letter to DHS and the United States Attorney General. While the 
STTAC’s designation in that letter as the primary state fusion center provides 
DHS with direction as to which center the governor wants information destined 
for the state to pass through, the title itself is arguably nominal in other contexts 
in that it does not signify the existence of any hierarchical structure or authority 
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possessed by the STTAC over the STTAS or its members. Since the STTAC and 
RTTACs are each autonomous and enjoy what is essentially a voluntary 
“horizontal” versus “hierarchical” working relationship within the STTAS, defining 
the appropriate role of the STTAC within the STTAS in the broader sense 
requires a collaborative agreement among STTAS members, especially if that 
role requires another center to relinquish some aspect of its sovereignty or 
acquiesce to another center’s role in performing some collective function.  
a. Provide Strategic Analysis and Support 
Based on the data points collected, which includes an examination 
of the historical and publicly stated role of the STTAC, the declared needs and 
recommendations of fundamental customers, a scanning of other state models, a 
comparison to methods abroad, and an assimilation of the widely accepted roles 
of the RTTACs, the appropriate role of the STTAC within California’s STTAS, 
succinctly defined, is to provide added value to the state’s STTAS network 
through comprehensive and reliable strategic analysis and support. This 
oversimplified acknowledgment of the STTAC’s necessary strategic role within 
the STTAS is supported by the current STTAS Strategic Business Plan Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) and State of California Homeland Security Strategy, 
both of which take note of the STTAC’s intended strategic functions. Survey data 
from the RTTACs also calls for strategic support from the STTAC, including 
strategic threat assessments and statewide situational awareness, which is 
consistent with the types of strategic products and services provided by other 
state fusion centers to their regional and/or local partners, as noted in the 
author’s scan of other states. In executing that role, the STTAC must be capable 
of strategically analyzing intelligence and information obtained from each of the 
RTTACs, as well as other sources, and to synthesize that intelligence information 
strategically into a broader understanding of its possible statewide implications, 
while simultaneously ensuring that each of the other RTTACs and other 
stakeholders are afforded situational awareness and any related strategic 
analyses. 
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b. Serve As California’s Primary Federal Point of Contact 
Inherent in the governor’s designation of the STTAC as California’s 
designated state fusion center is the acknowledgement that the STTAC is 
intended to serve as California’s primary point of contact for immediate homeland 
security related information from the federal government. This intended role is 
supported by literature calling upon states to make such a designation, the 
governor’s response letter to DHS, and other state fusion centers performing the 
same role or function. To fulfill this role, the STTAC must inherently be capable of 
doing more than just “receive” information from the federal government and must 
also have the capacity to “doing something” with that information once it is 
received. Accordingly, the role of the STTAC must include not only the ability to 
receive priority information from the federal government, day or night, but the 
strategic and logistical capabilities of determining to whom and where that 
information needs to go and how to get it there in the most efficient and timely 
manner.  
c. Keep Key State Officials and State Agencies Informed 
In accordance with the State of California’s Homeland Security 
Strategy and the STTAS CONOPS, the STTAC must be capable of providing key 
state officials, including the governor, state homeland security advisor, 
legislature, and other constitutional officers, with strategic information they may 
require in making timely statewide decisions in the best interests of the safety of 
California and its citizens. The STTAC’s performance of this role is readily 
acknowledged and supported by the RTTACs and is consistent with the role 
performed by other state fusion centers. Further, this comparative analysis of 
joint intelligence centers in the United Kingdom and Germany highlighted the 
importance of keeping key leaders informed. 
As the only fusion center in California managed by a state agency 
and principally staffed by personnel from state agencies, the STTAC’s role must 
also include ensuring that state departments and agencies are provided with 
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situation awareness on strategic intelligence and information germane to their 
mission or the safety of their employees. This role is consistent with the 
responsibilities executed by other state fusion centers and is supported by survey 
data collected by the RTTACs that failed to identify state agencies as a primary 
customer of the RTTACs. Given that state agencies and employees are 
inherently located in each of the RTTACs’ operational regions and some state 
departments are also represented within the RTTACs themselves, it is 
appropriate for the STTAC to clarify this role in consultation with the RTTACs 
collaboratively to ensure that state agencies throughout California are provided 
with adequate situational awareness regarding statewide or regionally specific 
threats. 
d. Serve As an Active Participant, Facilitator, and/or 
Organizer Within the STTAS  
As highlighted in the opening comments to this question, one of the 
essential and perhaps undocumented roles of the STTAC is to be an active 
participant and collaborator within California’s STTAS. As previously mentioned, 
the STTAC’s designation as the primary state fusion center in the context of its 
relationship with other STTAS participants is largely a nominal or honorary title 
versus authoritative. While the importance of collaboration is highlighted in 
greater detail in the author’s response to subsequent research questions, one of 
the important roles the STTAC must play is to be an active participant, equal 
partner, and at times, a facilitator and/or organizer in seeking to strengthen the 
collaborative working relationship between the STTAC, RTTACs, and other 
stakeholders. Ultimately, collaboration is the fundamental adhesive that bonds 
together the combined efforts of the STTAC and RTTACs as part of a unified 
STTAS. With that understanding in mind, the role of the STTAC must be 
centered on strengthening the overall STTAS collaboration by supporting the 
RTTACs’ strategic intelligence needs and respecting their operational role within 
their respective regions. This informal facilitative role is similar to one exercised 
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by state fusion centers in Florida and Ohio in their efforts to bring all of the 
parties together as part of a more unified and synchronized statewide system.  
2. What Is the Appropriate Mission for the State Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center As It Relates to Strengthening Stakeholder 
Relationships? 
The appropriate mission for the STTAC is one that is collaboratively 
developed with input from its customers and stakeholders. Doing so ensures that 
the mission is capable of supporting the needs of its customers and more 
effective in addressing current and future threats to California. Including 
customers and stakeholders as participants in the process can help create “buy 
in” and strengthen stakeholder relationships, as it affords them the opportunity to 
be an active part of the STTAC’s design and a benefactor of the future services it 
provides.  
Survey data from California's sheriffs and police chiefs shows that their 
primary community threats and greatest intelligence needs involve gangs, 
narcotics, weapons, and terrorism, in descending order. These combined 
intelligence requirements most appropriately fall within the realm of an all crimes 
fusion center. Based on this research, most of the RTTACs have adopted an all 
crimes mission. Doing so is consistent with the demonstrated all crimes 
intelligence needs of their customers, and therefore, appears appropriately 
aligned.  
One of the primary roles of the STTAC is to provide strategic support to 
the RTTACs in carrying out their missions. To do so successfully, the STTAC 
must be capable of supporting the strategic intelligence needs of the RTTACs 
and those of the RTTACs’ customers. When surveyed regarding their current 
intelligence requirements, the RTTACs expressed a desire for the STTAC to 
provide statewide situational awareness, strategic analytical products, and 
analytical support to assist them in performing their mission. Each of those 
requests is consistent with strategic services currently provided by other state 
fusion centers. For the STTAC to provide added value to the RTTACs and 
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strengthen stakeholder relationships with the RTTACs and their customers, the 
STTAC must provide services capable of addressing the current threats and 
intelligence needs of the RTTACs’ jurisdictions and local customers—specifically, 
all crimes intelligence.  
As highlighted in this thesis, the STTAC’s mission has historically been 
focused on anti-terrorism only. As such, its mission conflicts with current federal 
guidance suggesting that fusion centers adopt an all crimes and/or all hazards 
format, is inconsistent with the mission of other state fusion centers examined in 
this research, and most importantly, is incapable of providing the broad range of 
strategic services necessary to address the current threats facing California and 
the needs of the RTTACs and their customers. Simply put, the STTAC’s mission 
is out of alignment. That conclusion is further supported by data captured from 
California’s sheriffs and police chiefs recommending that the STTAC adopt an all 
crimes mission and by surveys of the RTTACs strongly suggesting that the 
STTAC’s mission be clarified. Based on these findings, the STTAC should adopt 
an all crimes mission more properly aligned with the RTTACs and, ultimately, 
help in ensuring that the entire STTAS is properly aligned. Failing to do so would, 
in essence, signify that any strategic support provided by the STTAC would be 
incapable of supporting current intelligence functions of the RTTACs and their 
customers; thereby diminishing the STTAC’s value and potentially weakening its 
stakeholder relationships.  
Since the STTAS is intended to be a unified system, comprised of the 
STTAC and RTTACs, working collaboratively together to protect California and 
its citizens from current threats impacting this state, the STTAC’s adoption of an 
all crimes model appropriately helps to align the entire STTAS network in 
safeguarding California. The state of Florida has similarly adopted a common 
mission among all of its state and regional fusion centers, and this research of 
joint intelligence fusion centers in the United Kingdom and Germany also 
supports the notion that adopting a common mission among participants is 
advantageous.  
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Finally, since the potential stakeholders having a vested interest in 
defining the mission of the STTAC is arguably broader than the RTTACs and 
local law enforcement agencies, it is important that the STTAC also take into 
consideration the needs of other prospective customers when developing 
products and that it collaboratively reevaluate its mission on a recurring basis in 
conjunction with the RTTACs and other stakeholders so that its mission remains 
capable of supporting the STTAS, RTTACs, and their customers, and does not 
again become outdated, irrelevant, and misaligned.  
3. How Do You Maintain Fusion Center Support and Promote 
Sustainability in an Ever-changing Political and Economic 
Environment? 
The term “sustainability” in the context of fusion centers has many 
possible meanings. A growing volume of literature exists that discusses fusion 
center sustainability primarily as a function of economic costs and highlights 
mounting concerns by state homeland security advisors and other officials over 
the need for continued and sustainable funding. Those concerns are echoed in 
California, as the future sustainability of the STTAC and RTTACs are undeniably 
dependent upon continued federal funding since, as indicated in Chapter IV, 
California’s sheriffs and police chiefs resoundingly indicate they are incapable of 
providing financial support in today’s economic environment.  
Fusion center sustainability is also dependent upon the availability of 
adequate personnel resources. Once again, the majority of California’s local law 
enforcement leaders indicate they cannot provide direct personnel support to 
fusion centers in light of fiscal constraints and the need to direct resources 
towards other community priorities. Interestingly, a number of law enforcement 
leaders surveyed indicated they would consider providing personnel if those 
resources could be connected remotely from their own agency through some 
form of “virtual” connectivity.  
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Accordingly, this may be a viable area for future research. While the DHS 
is “rolling out” personnel to each of the nation’s fusion centers as part of its 
commitment to support fusion center staffing, it is important that fusion centers 
work to maintain the personnel resources they have by demonstrating to their 
contributing agencies that they are an important investment and critical to their 
own operations. This leads to a third context of sustainability that this research 
suggests may, in fact, be the most critical factor in ensuring the sustainability of 
fusion centers—continued relevancy in the eyes of their customers; in other 
words, value.  
To be sustainable and garner continued support, fusion centers must 
remain relevant by offering added value to their customers on a recurring basis. 
While political support for California's fusion centers remains high based on 
surveys of local law enforcement agencies, they must continue to provide added 
value if they hope to maintain that level of support. To do so, fusion centers must 
assess the needs of their customers on an ongoing basis through surveys, 
briefings, and other methods to identify potential gaps in intelligence needs and 
deliverables to ensure the centers’ services are properly aligned. Including 
customer input in the development of fusion center services helps to create “buy 
in” and affords the customer an opportunity to be an active participant. For 
example, since gangs, narcotics, and weapons are the top three intelligence 
concerns of local law enforcement leaders in California today, California fusion 
centers must evaluate their current capabilities in those areas and explore 
methods, such as collaborative partnerships with gang task forces, to increase 
their level of service to their customers. Understanding that sheriffs and police 
chiefs are in search of increased information sharing, greater communication, 
and additional gang related intelligence, as reflected in survey data discussed in 
Chapter IV, offers fusion centers an insight in how to transition high levels of 
customer support and satisfaction to even greater heights; thereby, increasing 
their relevancy, support, and likelihood of future sustainability.  
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“Do what you do so well 
they will want to see it 




Succinctly put, the way fusion centers can maintain support and 
sustainability in today’s political and economic environment is to ensure that 
fusion centers remain relevant, offer a 
valued service to their customers, and are 
responsive to their needs. This research 
reveals that similar to the business world, 
the customers ultimately decide the value 
of fusion centers and not the fusion 
centers themselves. The fact that fusion 
centers believe they are providing a valuable
their customers and stakeholders view those services differently. 
 service is of little consequence if 
4. How Can Horizontal “Center-to-Center” Collaboration Be 




Strengthened Between the State Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Center and the Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Centers? 
portance 
shed. Realistically, the strength of collaboration between fusion centers, 
such as the STTAC and RTTACs, is largely dependent upon the strength of each 
participant’s willingness and desire to collaborate. As supported by this thesis, 
the collaborative working relationship between the STTAC and RTTACs is 
“horizontal” versus “hierarchical” in nature, where neither the STTAC nor the 
RTTACs are ultimately in charge of the collaboration. This horizontal relationship 
was also witnessed in the scan of other state fusion centers, as well as the 
research surrounding Germany’s joint intelligence center. 
Current literature highlights the importance of d
rsonal relationships and trust among fusion center participants when 
attempting to build or strengthen collaboration. While the current body of 
knowledge on collaboration in the context of fusion centers offers insights into 
building collaboration within the context of individual centers, it offers little  
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like the STTAC and RTTACs, where they are physically separated by great 
distances and face-to-face and interpersonal contact is thereby limited. 
This research into distant interagency collaborations suggests tha
e STTAC and RTTACs find alternative solutions to help increase their 
interaction and contact. To their credit, the STTAC and RTTACs have already 
established a number of standing work groups to increase the relationships 
between the centers and their personnel. For example, the STTAS commanders 
group, lead analyst working group (LAWG), and TLO managers working group 
each afford the opportunity for personnel from STTAC and RTTACs to work 
jointly together, both in person and remotely, in an effort to improve collaboration 
and strengthen interpersonal relationships and trust. Similarly, the scan of other 
states revealed that state fusion centers in Florida and Ohio also use meetings, 
briefings, conference calls, and other methods in an attempt to increase contact. 
To further strengthen collaboration between the STTAC and RTTACs and 
increase interagency participation, additional opportunities to enhance 
interpersonal relationships and trust must be explored, as supported by literature 
and data from the RTTACs. One prospective option highlighted in this thesis 
involves the use of each center’s existing video conferencing capabilities to 
increase face-to-face contact “virtually” on a frequent basis. Doing so is 
consistent with recommendations from the RTTAC commanders, as mentioned 
in Chapter V, calling for enhanced collaboration between the STTAC and RTTAC 
commanders. Other RTTAC recommendations for strengthening collaboration 
between the STTAC and RTTACs include a desire for the STTAC to define its 
mission clearly and demonstrate its ability to generate useful strategic products 
capable of adding value to the STTAS and its members. This insightful 
recommendation speaks to the heart of many of the author’s findings in his 




ost significant realization through the body of this thesis and conceptually offers 
e advantage strives to create 
synerg
this thesis, to attain collaborative advantage and 
streng
m
the greatest opportunity for strengthening collaboration between the STTAC and 
RTTACs—developing “collaborative advantage.” 
As discussed in Chapter VIII, collaborativ
y among organizations participating in collaboration—specifically, between 
the STTAC and RTTACs—by providing each member with a heightened 
incentive to collaborate more closely because they each derive a greater value 
collectively than they can achieve individually (Huxham & Vangen, 2000, p. 772). 
In short, this means increasing the collective value possible through the STTAS 
to a point where it far surpasses what each center can possibly achieve on its 
own, or via a smaller subset, so that each of the centers want to work closer 
together given the value and advantages of doing so. In many ways, this ties in 
directly with some of the principles and findings highlighted in the prior thesis 
questions related to the STTAC’s role, mission, and sustainability, in that it again 
focuses on the notion of providing added value and relevancy; in this case, to the 
STTAS and its members. 
As supported by 
then collaboration, the STTAC and RTTACs must collaboratively define, 
with input from their customers and stakeholders, the collective goals and 
objectives for the STTAS, to include each participant’s role and responsibility as 
part of that collaboration. Furthermore, the agreement must remain current, 
relevant, and reflective of a relationship that each center supports. While a 
STTAS CONOPS currently exists, it is currently outdated. In an effort to clarify 
and strengthen the STTAS CONOPS, the STTAC and RTTACs need to revise 
the agreement collaboratively with input from federal, state, and local 
stakeholders. Doing so allows participants and stakeholders to provide input and, 
in turn, helps to create “buy in” and ensures that the STTAS remains viable and 




usion Center is currently undergoing a similar endeavor in its attempts to 
f the recommendations highlighted in this chapter regarding 
collabo
F
develop a statewide communication plan and CONOPS among its state and 
regional centers.  
Finally, all o
ration mean nothing, if they are not sustainable. If the extent of the 
collaboration among STTAS participants rests solely in the hands of the centers’ 
five individual commanders, then it is susceptible to weakening, or, in a worst 
case scenario, falling apart should one or more of those commanders leave their 
current assignment. As was demonstrated through this thesis, the installation of a 
new management team within the STTAC has understandably resulted in the 
new commander having to seek to develop interpersonal relationships and 
reestablish trust with the other STTAS commanders, the importance of which 
cannot be overstated. Therefore, efforts to strengthen collaboration among the 
STTAC and RTTACs must include efforts to refine it continually and, ultimately, 
institutionalize it to deposit that strength into a system wide account. A 
recommended means of doing so is to establish a statewide STTAS advisory or 
advocacy committee comprised of an executive level representative, selected by 
each of the STTAC and RTTACs’ governance committees, and a diverse group 
of homeland security stakeholders, for the expressed purpose of capturing input 
and recommendations on an ongoing basis to assess the statewide alignment of 
the STTAS and determine how the system can continue to be effectively aligned 
and synchronized. This process would enable stakeholders to be more active 
participants in the collaboration, thereby strengthening and institutionalizing 
relationships over the entire system as a whole and not simply within the STTAC 
and RTTACs. By doing so, the collaboration is afforded the opportunity for 
system wide “buy in,” through providing a standing forum for ideas to be 
considered and, when appropriate, modifications to be made. Ultimately, this 




hile also helping to ensure its sustainability. In light of the fact that all four of the 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
s, like the STTAC and RTTACs, to 
collabo
w
RTTACs support this proposal, as highlighted in Chapter V, the STTAC and 
RTTACs should collectively move forward on this proposal.  
For state and regional fusion center
rate with one another successfully, two factors must arguably be present. 
The first is the willingness of each center to enter into and commit to a 
collaborative relationship and the second, and equally important factor, is the 
ability for each of the centers to do so. Without willingness and ability combined, 
the intended collaboration may amount to little more than “hope” for future 
collaboration, at a time when willingness and ability are both attainable. While 
this thesis briefly examined methods for increasing the ability for multiple fusion 
centers to collaborate remotely, through meetings, work groups, and conference 
calls, the majority of this work focused on increasing the willingness to do so. In 
light of the ongoing efforts to build a nationwide network of fusion centers, future 
research into methods for strengthening the ability for multiple centers to 
collaborate over great distances and share information is warranted.  
This thesis focused on methods to synchronize and ensure the proper 
alignm
D. CLOSING 
of this thesis, the author introduced a 40-year-old 
busine
ent of California’s state and regional fusion centers. An important area for 
future research surrounds how to synchronize state-to-state fusion center 
relationships and operations more collaboratively, and ultimately nationwide, and 
to determine whether the collaborative initiatives proposed in this thesis have 
possible applications to furthering state-to-state and state-to-federal fusion center 
alignment. 
At the start 
ssman who set out on horseback to share information whose value was 
such that it helped to change the course of American history. It has been nearly 
235 years since Paul Revere embarked on that late night journey to Lexington to 
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 has been made over the past eight years, many 
windin
warn others of an impending threat that would soon arrive on their doorstep. 
Although the size of this nation and population has grown exponentially over that 
period of time, so too have this country’s communications, transportation, and 
technological capabilities. Despite the dramatic differences between these two 
time periods, the goals of Paul Revere and today’s fusion centers remain 
remarkably similar in that both seek to protect this nation and its citizens against 
unforeseen threats and, whenever possible, prevent future attacks from 
occurring. In 1775, Paul Revere and his fellow patriots were successful in 
providing critical information at the precise moment it was needed and, in doing 
so, helped to alter the course of American history. Regretfully, there would be no 
similar warning to help successfully avert the tragedies of 9/11. For that reason, 
9/11 has also been a turning point in global history by highlighting the need for 
this country to remain alert and vigilant in the face of current and future threats. 
Today’s fusion centers offer this nation a promising modern day version of Paul 
Revere and his co-patriots.  
While much progress
g roads still exist ahead. To be truly successful as a statewide or 
nationwide system, it is necessary to ensure that every fusion center rides 
together towards the same intended destination instead of drifting onto different 
paths and heading in opposing directions. The author’s personal journey, as 
chronicled in this thesis, offers a proposed road map towards the next generation 
of fusion centers in California, where each center rides together and stays 
together regardless of what turns lie in the road ahead. 
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